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AGAINST COMMON SENSE: WHY TITLE VII SHOULD
PROTECT SPEAKERS OF BLACK ENGLISH
Jill Gaulding*
The speech of many black Americans is marked by phrases such as
'we be writin"' or "we don't have no problem&" Because most listeners
consider such "Black English" speech patterns incorrect, these speak-
ers face significant disadvantages in the job market. But common
sense suggests that there is nothing discriminatory about employers'
negative reactions to Black English because it makes sense to allow
employers to insist that employees use correct grammar.
This article argues against this common sense understanding of
Black English as bad grammar. The author first analyzes the extent
of the job market disadvantages faced by Black English speakers and
discusses the failure of common sense solutions designed to eliminate
Black English speech patterns. The author then provides linguistic
evidence to show that Black English is actually a distinct but equally
valid dialect of English, which for historical reasons is largely lim-
ited to the African American community. She argues that, given this
scientifically accurate understanding of Black English, employers
who reject Black English speakers because of their speech patterns
are in fact violating Title VII's prohibition against race discrimina-
tion. The author explains why discrimination against Black English
speakers should fall under the existing Title VII disparate impact
framework and suggests a possible extension of Title VII doctrine to
protect those Black English speakers whose employment opportuni-
ties are limited by weak written language skills. Throughout the
Article, the author challenges readers to consider the sources and ef-
fects of their own 'common sense" beliefs about language and urges
them to accept responsibility for solving the problem of language dis-
crimination.
* Bundeskanzler Scholar, University of Ttibingen, Germany. B.S. 1988, Massa-
chussetts Institute of Technology (Brain and Cognitive Sciences); M.S. 1990,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Linguistics); J.D. 1995, Cornell Law School. I
would like to thank Steven Pinker, John Rickford, and Winnie Taylor for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this Article (errors naturally remain my own) and-although
none of them necessarily agrees with the views expressed in this Article-Stewart
Schwab, Gary Simson, David Wippman, and Chuck Wolfram for their general support
and encouragement. Thanks are also due to the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform editors for their patience in the face of delays and to LEXIS-NEXIS Services for
its generous extension of online access. This Article is dedicated to my former students
at Junior High School 117 in Brooklyn, New York, who definitely taught me more
than I taught them.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you were interviewing an applicant for a mid-level
administrative position with your New York firm, and she said
the following during the interview:
"I will aks my boss to send you a recommendation."
"In my department we be writing grant proposals all the
time."
"I never had no problems wit IBM computers."
Would you hire this applicant? If your inclination is to say
"no," you are not alone. Many employers would reject this ap-
plicant because she seems to lack a basic requirement for the
job: the ability to speak proper English.
If you feel any qualms about this negative reaction, they
probably arise from something else you noticed about this ap-
plicant: she is black. But common sense tells you that this fact
is irrelevant. The applicant lost a job opportunity because of
her deficient language skills, not because of her race. If blacks
1. See infra Part II.B.2 for an explanation of this observation. In brieC the in-
terviewer and the reader could tell from the applicant's speech that she is black
because her speech has the characteristic features of a dialect spoken by a large per-
centage of the black population of the United States. For historical and social reasons,
this dialect is not usually spoken by members of other ethnic groups.
I apologize to those readers who may be offended by my choice not to capitalize the
label "black." I actually agree with Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw's argument that
capitalization would be more appropriate, because "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and
other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation
as a proper noun." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1332 n.2 (1988). Yet I also agree with Professor Barbara Flagg's argument that the
terms "white" and 'black" should be treated equivalently, since we otherwise risk rein-
forcing the idea that only blacks, as "the other," have a race, while white ethnicity
becomes the hidden norm. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953, 955 n.7 (1993). This risk also applies to the otherwise useful term "people of
color."
Although Professor Flagg states that she chooses to capitalize neither term "in the
interest of defusing potential charges of essentialism," id., I do not believe that this is
a relevant concern: Why should the capitalized labels "Black" and "White" be any
more essentialist than "Asian" or "Latino"? I think the real problem is that the capi-
talized word "White" is visually jarring-, it creates an unnerving typographical kinship
to white supremacists' writings. The proper approach may be to capitalize both
"White" and "Black" anyway, as this could be a step towards Professor Flagg's project
of developing a positive white ethnicity. But in the interest of typographically alien-
ating as few readers as possible, I have chosen instead to capitalize neither term.
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for some reason tend to have deficient language skills, the
common sense solution would be to ensure that they have the
opportunity to improve those skills, perhaps by offering reme-
dial training. Common sense suggests that a negative reaction
to the applicant could not be discriminatory or unlawful.
In this Article, I will argue against common sense. I will ar-
gue that common sense solutions to blacks' language problems
have failed and are likely to continue to fail because they are
based on a false view of the nature of language and the nature
of Black English in particular. I will argue that the proper so-
lution is to understand differences in language as diversity,
not deficiency, and that Title VII can and should be used to en-
force this radical solution. Finally, I will examine some of the
broader implications of the radical solution.2
I. DIFFERENCE AS DEFICIENCY: THE COMMON SENSE
VIEW OF BLACK ENGLISH
A. The Dilemma of the Black English Speaker
The speech of many blacks in the United States differs from
Standard English.' According to language researchers, "blacks
... have a distinctive speech community."4 Linguists have la-
beled this distinctive form of speech "Black English."5 But
2. The arguments in this Article have been especially inspired and influenced
by Professor Mari J. Matsuda's article, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
Some analytical differences between her approach and mine are discussed in Part III
infra. The Article also draws heavily from two recently published linguistics books:
STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE (1995)
and ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
3. I capitalize "Standard" in "Standard English," in opposition to the usual prac-
tice, because I am using the term as a label for a particular dialect. The phrase
.standard English," like the phrase "proper English," refers to a concept of language
which I will argue against. See infra Part II.B.1.
4. Jeffrey E. Nash, Race and Words: A Note on the Sociolinguistic Divisiveness
of Race in American Society, 61 Soc. INQUIRY 252, 260 (1991).
5. See, e.g., DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 96-97 (1995) (using the term "Black English"); J.L. DILLARD, BLACK
ENGLISH: ITs HISTORY AND USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); BLACK ENGLISH: A
SEMINAR (Deborah Sears Harrison & Tom Trabasso eds., 1976).
An alternative label is "BEV" or "Black English Vernacular," where "vernacular" re-
fers to the fact that Black English is primarily spoken, not written. See WILLIAM
LABOV, LANGUAGE IN THE INNER CITY: STUDIES IN THE BLACK ENGLISH VERNACULAR 3
(1972) (using the term "BEV"); Elizabeth Closs Traugott, Pidgins, Creoles, and the
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listeners do not need any special expertise in linguistics to
recognize Black English:
Quite frequently one who is at a loss in trying to define
Black English is not at a loss in recognizing it. How many
times have you heard someone speak on the telephone
and immediately knew the person was Black? You might
not be able to pinpoint how you knew, but you knew.'
It is possible to recognize Black English because it consists
of a number of identifiable linguistic features.7 For example,
Black English speakers use different pronunciations for
certain words, as with "aks" for "ask," "wit" for "with," "tes"
for "test," "den" for "then," and "toof" for "tooth";' use a bare
form of the verb "to be," as in "she be working";9 and use the
Origins of Vernacular Black English, in BLACK ENGLISH: A SEMINAR, supra, at 57, 62
(explaining terminology).
Another alternative is the term "AAVE" for "African American Vernacular English."
LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 15. This term may be the most accurate, since the dia-
lect is largely limited to the United States. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining how Black
English arose in the United States). Some linguists prefer the shorter label "AAE" for
"African American English." See, e.g., Geoffrey K Pullum, Language That Dare Not
Say Its Name, 386 NATURE 321 (1997).
Yet another possible label is "Ebonics" (combining "ebony" and "phonics"). This term
was coined in the 1970s as an alternative to expressions such as "nonstandard Eng-
lish" or "broken English." See ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, EBONICS: THE TRUE LANGUAGE OF
BLACK FOLKS viii-ix (1975). Although the term never became popular among lin-
guists, the Oakland, California School Board recently resolved to recognize "Ebonics"
as a language. See Lori Olszewski, Oakland Schools OK Black English, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 19, 1996, at Al (discussing Board's action); EBONICS-the Oakland Resolution,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1997, at A18 (containing full text of the School Board's resolu-
tion). This decision has generated a great deal of discussion about "Ebonics" in the
media. See, e.g., James E. Shaw, Don't Self-Inflict Another Obstacle, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1996, at B9; Elaine Woo & Solomon Moore, School Decision on Black English Stirs
Up a Storm of Commentary, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, at A24; All Things Considered:
Black English (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 20, 1996). I avoid the term
"Ebonics" in this Article because it tends to create confusion (e.g., that Black English
only involves a different "phonics" or sound system). See Pullum, supra (explaining
why linguists consider "Ebonics" a "misbegotten name").
6. Ann Covington, Black People and Black English: Attitudes and Deeducation
in a Biased Macroculture, in BLACK ENGLISH: A SEMINAR, supra note 5, at 255, 258.
7. Certain Black English speakers (usually teenagers) may also draw from a dif-
ferent vocabulary. The use of this vocabulary, or "slang," is not what distinguishes the
Black English dialect from Standard English. The use of slang is a distinct issue, both
linguistically and legally. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
8. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (discussing phonological fea-
tures of Black English).
9. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing durative tense in
Black English).
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so-called "double negative" construction, as in "I never had no
problem with no computer.""
Of course, not all blacks in the United States speak Black
English. The use of Black English is not a genetic trait; it is
the result of other factors." In many cases, these other factors
lead to black speakers speaking Standard English. But overall,
Black English is quite prevalent. Observers state that the
majority of blacks in the United States speak Black English at
least some of the time.12
During the 1960s, researchers compared the communication
patterns of black and white schoolchildren in various age groups,
and focused on the possibility that a cognitive deficiency was re-
sponsible for the patterns in black speech. 3 More recently, the
focus has been on education. Experts note that dialects like Black
English "seem to connote a lack of education,"" and politicians
10. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing negative concord
in Black English).
11. See DILLARD, supra note 5, at 230 (emphasizing that dialect differences are
more associated with social factors than with "racial" factors); see also John Kallend,
Black English, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1995, at 2 (noting that Black English is really
American Black English, since Black English is not spoken by blacks in Africa or
England).
Unfortunately, the Oakland School Board contributed to public confusion regarding
the nongenetic status of Black English when it stated, in its original resolution recog-
nizing Black English, that "African Language Systems are genetically based and not a
dialect of English." EBONICS-the Oakland Resolution, supra note 5. The Board de-
nies that it intended the word "genetic" in the sense of human genetics; it later
explained that "[t]he term 'genetically based' is used according to the standard dic-
tionary definition of 'has origins in,'" and was meant to refer to Black English's
origins in African languages. Nanette Asimov, US. Says Ebonics Isn't a Language, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 25, 1996, at Al. Later the Board withdrew the misleading statement
entirely. See Kenneth R. Weiss & Richard Lee Colvin, Oakland Schools Drop 2 Key
Points in Ebonics Stand, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997, at A3.
12. See Sonya Live: Black English (CNN television broadcast, May 5, 1992) (June
Jordan, professor of African American studies at the University of California at Ber-
keley, states that Black English is the first language of a majority of African
Americans.); see also LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 176 (citing studies placing the
number of Black English speakers at 80-90% of the black population). This figure is
an estimate, based in part on the supposition that Black English is more commonly
spoken within working class and poor communities. See id.
13. See Martin Deutsch, The Role of Social Class in Language Development and
Cognition, 35 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 78 (1965); Vera P. John, The Intellectual Devel-
opment of Slum Children: Some Preliminary Findings, 33 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
813 (1963); Harry Osser et al., The Young Child's Ability to Imitate and Comprehend
Speech: A Comparison of Two Sub-Cultural Groups, 40 CHILD DEV. 1063 (1969). These
studies have since been thoroughly discredited by linguistic analyses of Black English.
See Part II.B infra (providing linguistic explanation for variance between Standard
English and Black English).
14. Sam Roberts, When Speaking to Mayor Koch, Ax No Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1988, at Bi (quoting Dr. Doris F. Weisberg, chairwoman of the speech de-
partment at City College in New York); see also Felicia R. Lee, Lingering Conflict in
642 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [
and school administrators have urged schools to do a better job
teaching Standard English. 5
Regardless of the supposed source of the problem-cognitive
deficiencies or school failures-most seem to agree on one
thing: Black English is a problem because it is an incorrect
version of Standard English."6 In other words, Black English is
bad grammar. 7 Both blacks and whites hold this view. 8 For
example, one black author refers to Black English as simply
"poor language skills" and "jive."9 A black columnist explains
why his mother would say "Speak English!" to him as a child
when he used Black English: "It was a recurring theme with
her. She always wanted me to speak in complete sentences
that were grammatically correct.... [This was just] 'talking
proper.' "
20
the Schools: Black Dialect vs. Standard Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, at Al, D22
(Bronx schoolteacher asserts that "[wlhen my students use bad English, I tell them it
is bad English and that it has nothing to do with the color of their skin.").
15. For example, Ed Koch, then Mayor of New York City, asked the Chancellor of
Education to develop a program to teach students to avoid the following- saying "aks"
for "ask," dropping the "g" from participles, using "ain't" for "isn't," and using "be" in
sentences like "we be going." See Carolyn Peluso Atkins, Do Employment Recruiters
Discriminate on the Basis of Nonstandard Dialect?, 30 J. EMPLOYMENT COUNSELING
108, 108-09 (1993) (describing Koch's request); Roberts, supra note 14. At least one
school board candidate has made the eradication of Black English part of his cam-
paign platform. See Ray Allen, Candidate Advocates Strong English Grammar
Instruction, WIS. S.J., Mar. 25, 1995, at 7A.
16. The Oakland School Board's resolution to accept Black English as a lan-
guage, see supra note 5, is the exception that proves the rule. The resolution itself,
though confusingly written, did seem to reject the notion that Black English is simply
an incorrect version of Standard English. See EBONICS-the Oakland Resolution,
supra note 5; Olszewski, supra note 5. But the public reaction to this resolution was so
overwhelmingly negative, see, e.g., Shaw, supra note 5; Woo & Moore, supra note 5,
that the Board was forced to withdraw it.
17. The principal of a D.C. elementary school, speaking about his students' use of
language, stated: "They don't speak 'Black English.' They use 'bad grammar.'"
ELEANOR WILSON ORR, TWICE AS LESS: BLACK ENGLISH AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
BLACK STUDENTS IN MATH AND SCIENCE 10 (1987).
18. See LIPPI-GREEN, -supra note 2, at 179-201 (discussing negative reactions of
both blacks and whites to Black English).
19. Olivia Abraham, The Trap of Black English, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 6, 1994, at
21A
20. Don Williamson, Adding PEP to the Language of Success, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1992, at A10. Many other sources demonstrate that this view of Black English
is widely held. See, e.g., Wayne Lionel Aponte, "'Talkin' White,'" ESSENCE, Jan. 1989,
at 11 (the put-down of "talkin' white" is addressed to those whose speech is gramati-
cally correct); Jo-Ann Armao, Black Student English Class Offends Some, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 1991, at D1 (black County Council president stated that "the message we
should be sending out is that there is no place for bad English by anyone"); Clarence
Page, For Royal Treatment, Speak King's English, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 22,
1989, at 3C (characterizing "standard" English as "proper" English, but noting that
"[t]here is nothing intrinsically white about good language skills"); Rochell Denise
[VOL. 31:3
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The public reaction to the recent decision by the school
board in Oakland, California to recognize Black English as the
primary language of many of its black students 2' demonstrates
how strongly this negative view is held. The Reverend Jesse
Jackson was one of many black leaders who immediately
spoke out against the decision, expressing his concern that the
board intended to encourage students to "talk garbage."22
Commentators viewed the Board's action as "condescending"
and "an excuse to justify bad grammar,"23 and complained that
it was "just so incredibly stupid."24
Because this is the common sense understanding of Black
English, those who speak Black English are at a severe disad-
vantage in the job market. Employers react negatively to them
because they seem to have deficient language skills. Individu-
als who cannot, or will not, speak proper English are simply
not ideal employees.
Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that employees suffer a
handicap if they speak Black English. Denise Page, a thirty-
three-year-old college-educated senior trader, provides an
example. 25 After working at the Chicago Board Options
Exchange for nine years, she hoped to be promoted to manager.26
Her supervisor commended her job skills and knowledge but
said that her ability to articulate that knowledge was
impaired by her use of Black English. 27 The supervisor
recommended that she attend a special class to try to
eliminate Black English features from her speech.28
Thomas, A Manner of Speaking: Black English Is a Difference, Not a Disability, Wls.
S.J., Mar. 22, 1995, at 1A (noting that some middle class blacks view Black English as
a "display of ignorance and a lack of education").
21. See supra note 5. Once again, I choose not to use the label "Ebonics" for Black
English because it reflects confusion about the nature of the differences between
Black English and Standard English; it is not a term used by contemporary linguists.
See id. The virulence of the reaction to the Board's proposal may be linked to the
Board's poor choice of words-not only the use of the "Ebonics" label, but also the
statement that Black English is "genetically based" and "not a dialect of English." See
EBONICS-the Oakland Resolution, supra note 5; see also supra note 11.
22. See Susan Ferriss, Oakland School Chief Shifts on "Ebonics," S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 27, 1996, at Al; see also Shaw, supra note 5 (stating that Black English compiles
"verbal deformit[ies)"); Nanette Asimov & Lori Olszewski, Black English Decision Hits
National Nerve, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1996, at Al (noting that Stanford professor
Shelby Steele called Black English "slang").
23. Woo & Moore, supra note 5, at A24.
24. Id.
25. See Pamela Sherrod, Some Try to Fine-Tune a Voice of Experience, CHIC.
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In some cases employers are more concerned about custom-
ers' reactions to an employee's use of Black English. Michael
Evans, an assistant to the president of a small business,
sought help from a speech pathologist to rid himself of Black
English.29 He took this step at the urging of his boss, who had
noticed how negatively customers reacted to speaking with
Evans on the phone. °
Sometimes employers do not give employees the opportunity
to seek help to alter their speech patterns; they simply fire
employees who do not speak Standard English. An advisor at a
job center notes: "We have some people who are going to lose
their jobs partly because of the way they talk .... It's not a
race issue but a perception issue. Their employers are feeling
that maybe they aren't right for the job because of their
speaking style."3'
One employer's observation captures the general attitude
toward Black English: "[Some black workers] do not have
black accents .... I think the accent is a big part of it .... [Ihf
someone is black but they speak with the same accent as a
Midwestern white person, it completely changes the percep-
tion of them."32 Another employer describes one "problem"
employee: "He did not speak really white English American.
He spoke black American English. And there's a big discrep-
ancy there. A lot of black people are very bright and speak
both black and white, but some don't speak white, and that
makes it very hard."33
In fact, evidence regarding the negative impact of Black
English goes far beyond the anecdotal. A number of studies
have concluded that speakers of Black English are at a disad-
vantage with respect to every aspect of employment, including
hiring, promotions, and salary. One study of Chicago-area em-
ployers of sales, customer service, and clerical workers found
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Thomas, supra note 20.
32. Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But...": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 224
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
33. Id. at 220. This employer's use of the labels "black" and "white" is interesting,
since proponents of the common sense view of Black English would probably deny
that the differences between Standard English and Black English could have any
racial or ethnic meaning. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14 (quoting teacher who tells stu-
dents that speaking Black English is "bad English" but that it "has nothing to do with
the color of their skin"). The employer's use of these labels is actually compatible with
the linguistic view of Black English discussed infra Part II.B.2.
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that they ranked "communication skills" at the top of their job
criteria lists3' and that they often found that black applicants
failed to meet this requirement. 35 One Chicago personnel offi-
cer commented that "[blacks] don't know how to speak."6
Indeed, the study found, "[bilack speech patterns were an im-
mediate marker of an undesirable job candidate."37
Other studies have found that Standard English speakers
are more successful in job interviews 38 and that recruiters are
less likely to offer a job to a Black English speaker.9 Standard
English speakers have an advantage when seeking better
paying jobs,'0 particularly supervisory jobs,4" sales jobs,'2 tech-
nical jobs,3 and jobs involving public contact."
In one study, one hundred personnel managers of large
businesses who had advertised position openings in local
newspapers for secretaries were sent one of six black female
college students.4' Three of the test applicants spoke Standard
English and three spoke Black English." The study found that
the applicants who spoke Black English were given shorter
interviews (an average of 17.34 minutes versus 24.64 minutes
for Standard English speakers), were offered far fewer jobs
(eight for Black English speakers versus 17 for Standard Eng-
lish speakers), and were offered significantly lower salaries for
those jobs (an average of $3.52 per hour versus $5.34 per hour
for Standard English speakers).47
34. See Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 32, at 218.
35. See id. at 223.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Robert Hopper, Language Attitudes in the Employment Interview, 44
COMM. MONOGRAPHS, 346 (1977).
39. See Atkins, supra note 15 (describing study performed with 65 employment
recruiters that found that they were less likely to offer a job to an applicant who
spoke Black English).
40. See Darwin Turner, Black Students, Language, and Classroom Teachers, in
TAPPING POTENTIAL 30, 37 (Charlotte Brooks ed., 1985) (stating that use of language
may not matter for menial jobs, but it does matter for better paying jobs).
41. See Hopper, supra note 38, at 350-51.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See WALT WOLFRAM & RALPH FASOLD, THE STUDY OF SOCIAL DTALECT IN
AMERICAN ENGLISH 21 (1974) (describing study that shows employers use Standard
English as a criterion for placing people in positions involving contact with the pub-
lic).
45. See Sandra L. Terrell & Francis Terrell, Effects of Speaking Black English
upon Employment Opportunities, ASHA (AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS'N),
June 1983, at 27, 27-28.
46. See id. at 28.
47. See id. at 28-29.
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Thus, studies have found that "[employers] who state that
they do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, relig-
ion, age, national origin, or handicap [do] seem to be
discriminating on the basis of nonstandard dialect."4 8 But most
people would find the label "discrimination" inapposite here. If
employers are reacting to Black English as bad grammar,
rather than using Black English as a proxy for stereotypes
about blacks,49 their reaction is only appropriate-it is common
sense. An employer who screens most job applicants on the
telephone on the basis of their "grammar and English" ex-
plains: "I have every right to say that that's a requirement for
this job. I don't care if you're pink, black, green, yellow, or or-
ange, I demand someone who speaks well."'
B. Failures of the Common Sense Solution
The common sense solution for Black English speakers is to
improve their language skills, in other words, to learn to speak
Standard English. This solution could be implemented through
48. Atkins, supra note 15, at 117.
49. Pure prejudice may explain part of employers' reactions to Black English.
Studies have found that in addition to rejecting Black English as bad grammar, em-
ployers associate Black English with specific personality traits. One study conducted
with four Mississippi employers showed that students who had undergone training in
"Broadcast English" (Standard English) were rated more "intelligent, competent, lik-
able, self-expressive, and employable" than their peers who lacked the training. See
Judy Floyd Robbins, Employers' Language Expectations and Nonstandard Dialect
Speakers, ENG. J., Oct. 1988, at 22. Another study found that "although respondents
perceived Black English speakers to be sociable, interesting, and trustworthy, they
also perceived them to be pessimistic, contrary, disreputable, unorganized, unemploy-
able, uncertain, uncomfortable, dependent, not creative, incompetent, lazy,
unintelligent, naive, inferior, negative, and unprofessional." Atkins, supra note 15, at
108. Both white and black listeners make these associations. See Richard C. Doss &
Alan M. Gross, The Effects of Black English and Code-Switching on Intraracial Percep-
tions, 20 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 282, 283 (1994); G. Richard Tucker & Wallace E. Lambert,
White and Negro Listeners' Reactions to Various American-English Dialects, in
PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK ENGLISH 369, 375-77 (J. Dillard ed., 1975).
The point of this Article is not to argue that these reactions to Black English are
wrong. If negative associations arise in response to the speaker as a black individual,
rather than in response to the speaker's language, then they are clearly discrimina-
tory, and employers could be held liable for them under Title VII. This Article argues
that even absent this blatant type of discrimination, contemporary employer reactions
to Black English should be illegal. See infra Part III (arguing that Title VII should
prevent employers from rejecting Black English as bad grammar).
50. Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 32, at 223.
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mandatory or elective remedial programs in schools51 or
through programs in the private sector. Since many blacks
agree that Black English is bad grammar52 and are willing to
go to some length to eliminate Black English features from
their speech, 3 and since schools can claim some expertise in
the teaching of proper English, the common sense solution
should be easy to implement.
In fact, eradicating Black English or replacing it with
"bidialectism" (so that speakers can speak both Black English
and Standard English) has proven surprisingly difficult. Both
educators and employers have attempted to teach Standard
English to students or employees who speak Black English. At
least one industry consultant makes a living attempting to
teach Standard English skills to black employees,' and schools
nationwide have instituted remedial language programs for
black students.55
California schools have led recent efforts. For the past ten
years, eighteen of California's 1,000 school districts have of-
fered special instruction to black students.56 In Los Angeles the
PEP (Proficiency in English) program teaches Black English
speakers Standard English as a second language.57 Many other
school districts have copied Los Angeles's program or adopted
similar programs.58
Even without an official remedial program, teachers often
make extra efforts to help Black English speakers learn Stan-
dard English. One high school English teacher designed a
51. See Sol Adler, Comment on Social Dialects, ASHA (AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE
HEARING ASS'N), Apr. 1985, at 46 (arguing for mandatory bidialectism programs); Lor-
raine Cole, Response to Adler, ASHA (AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE HEARING ASS'N), Apr.
1985, at 47 (arguing that bidialectism programs should be elective).
52. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussing negative black re-
action to Black English).
53. This includes going to special classes and seeking help from a speech pa-
thologist. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
54. See Veneeta Acson, Appreciating Fluency in Other Dialects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1994, at A18.
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. See Cynthia Walker, Lessons Target Language as a Barrier for Blacks' Educa-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 11.
57. See Lee, supra note 14, at D22; Williamson, supra note 20, at A10; see also
Laura Griffin, Words to Teach By, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al
(describing similarly named "SEP" or "Standard English Proficiency" program adopted
in 1981 and now used in dozens of California schools).
58. For example, Seattle schools have instituted a program modeled on Los An-
geles's PEP program, see Williamson, supra note 20, at A10, and a Maryland
elementary school has begun a voluntary after-school program to help black students
learn Standard English. See Armao, supra note 20, at D1; see also Lee, supra note 14,
at Al (describing a variety of related programs).
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special unit in "Broadcast English" to emphasize differences
between Standard English and Black English for the Black
English speakers in her class. 9 These efforts do not end once
students leave high school; college instructors also emphasize
the importance of speaking Standard English.'
Despite these pervasive and persistent efforts, change has
been elusive. High school teachers note that their efforts
achieve little because "by the time they go to high school it's an
uphill battle."6 ' Indeed, traditional English teaching tech-
niques may actually lead to an increase in the use of Black
English features in student writing.62 Educators have also
been frustrated by the poor results of special programs de-
signed for Black English speakers. For instance, although Los
Angeles's PEP program is widely praised and imitated, it has
not actually improved the reading and writing scores (or, by
implication, the speaking habits) of the children involved.'
Students in the program did no better on the 1991-92 Califor-
nia Assessment Program than students not in the program."
Studies of speech communities confirm teachers' suspicions
that the programs are failing. At one time, "[elducators ...
predicted that as more black people entered the mainstream,
the dialect would fade not only among the middle class, as it
has, but also among the poor."' They were wrong. Indeed,
some language researchers have found that the use of spoken
Black English is increasing, rather than decreasing. In
particular, Black English is now more widespread in poor,
urban neighborhoods.s A three-year study funded by the
National Science Foundation and directed by University of
Pennsylvania linguist William Labov found that the language
of inner-city blacks is diverging further from Standard
English.67 Although the black middle class does not tend to
59. See Robbins, supra note 49, at 22.
60. See Julie L. Nicklin, "Switching" Between Black and Standard English,
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 20, 1994, at A6 (explaining why a college instructor and
speech pathologist teach students Standard English).
61. Lee, supra note 14 (quoting a New York high school teacher).
62. See HANNI TAYLOR, STANDARD ENGLISH, BLACK ENGLISH, AND BIDIALEC-
TALISM (1989) (reporting study findings).
63. See Diane Seo, The Talk Wars: Educators Say Street Language Has No Place
in the Job Market, but the Issue of Correcting Ethnic Speech Has Ignited an Emotional
Debate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at 16.
64. See id.
65. Lee, supra note 14.
66. See id.
67. See William Labov & Wendell A. Harris, De Facto Segregation of Black and
White Vernaculars, in DIVERSITY AND DIACHRONY 1, 20 (David Sankoff ed., 1986);
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speak Black English, the overall number of Black English
speakers is growing."
Furthermore, we cannot expect increasing exposure to
Standard English through television programs and movies to
make any difference. The mass media do not contribute to
Black English speakers becoming Standard English speakers
because linguistic behavior is far more influenced by interac-
tive relationships than by passive language input.69
One expert on Black English summarized the problem as
follows:
Many blacks consider [the view that Black English is un-
grammatical] serious enough that they seek help from
teachers, linguists, therapists, and even drama coaches.
Under social pressure from within and outside the ver-
nacular black community, attempts have been made to
eradicate, supplement, or replace street speech with stan-
dard English. Most approaches have failed for one reason
or another, and, to the best of my knowledge, no single
technique has proved successful on a large scale.0
Thus, although the common sense solution should be easy, ex-
perience shows that it is not. 1
The dilemma of the Black English speaker is intensified by
the reaction of some members of the black community to the
pressure to speak Standard English: "black youngsters ...
ridicule each other's efforts to learn proper English as 'talking
William K Stevens, Study Finds Blacks' English Increasingly Different, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1985, at A14 (discussing Labov's study). But see LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at
184 (noting that Labov's results are still open to challenge and that the "convergence-
divergence" controversy is ongoing).
68. See Stevens, supra note 67 ("[T]he absolute number of speakers of the black
vernacular has also increased.").
69. See id.
70. JoHN BAUGH, BLACK STREET SPEECH: ITS HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND
SURVIVAL 55 (1983).
71. This is not to say that students who speak Black English cannot under any
circumstances be taught Standard English in school. Teaching programs based on a
linguistic understanding of Black English, see infra Part II.B.2, may not guarantee
complete fluency in Standard English, but they have proven far more effective than
standard teaching techniques that treat Black English as "bad grammar." See infra
note 313 and accompanying text (discussing studies of teaching methods). It is a sepa-
rate question whether such teaching techniques, even if completely effective, should
be our answer to the "problem" of Black English. See infra Part IV (discussing
"minimally radical" solution).
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white.'"" This reaction places black students in a double bind:
"If they don't speak standard English, they will be corrected at
school. But if they speak standard English, their friends will
ridicule them."73
The fact that some blacks resist-the pressure to speak Stan-
dard English may help to explain the failure of the common
sense solution:
The persistence of the [Black English] dialect reflects, in
part, the growing resistance of some black young people to
assimilate and their efforts to use language as part of a
value system that prizes cultural distinction.... [Yloung
people acknowledge an element of resistance, and even a
stigma, to using standard English or "talking proper."74
However, this stigma cannot completely explain the failure
of the common sense solution because many blacks do not feel
it: they clearly want to become Standard English speakers and
they work hard toward this goal.75
C. Summary
The dilemma for speakers of Black English is clear. The way
that they speak is almost universally considered wrong. Their
apparent lack of language skills means that they are far less
likely to be hired, promoted, or given higher salaries. Recog-
nizing these enormous disadvantages in the employment
market, many Black English speakers work hard to become
speakers of Standard English, with the support of educators
and language consultants nationwide. And yet Black English
has not been eradicated; in fact, the use of Black English is
increasing.
72. Page, supra note 20; see also Aponte, supra note 20, at 11 (describing pres-
sure from peers not to "talk white"); Williamson, supra note 20 (noting peer pressure
against "talking proper").
73. Seo, supra note 63, at 16.
74. Lee, supra note 14, at Al; see also LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 191-92
(discussing pressures placed on blacks who speak Standard English); Michale D. Linn
& Gene Pich6, Black and White Adolescent and Preadolescent Attitudes Toward Black
English, in DIALECT AND LANGUAGE VARIATION 574, 578 (Harold B. Allen & Michael D.
Linn eds., 1986) (discussing prestige of Black English among black teens).
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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In the face of this dilemma, common sense comes up empty.
It cannot explain why some blacks stubbornly resist society's
demand that they use Standard English, and it cannot explain
why extensive remedial efforts have thus far been so unsuc-
cessful. All common sense can advise is that we try more of the
same: increase the number and intensity of remedial English
programs and redouble efforts to convince Black English
speakers that their speech is wrong and requires correction.
II. DIFFERENCE AS DIVERSITY: A RADICAL SOLUTION TO
THE "PROBLEM" OF BLACK ENGLISH
A. A Radical Solution
I propose that we stop identifying Black English as the
problem and acknowledge instead that the typical employer's
reaction to Black English is the real problem. In other words, I
argue that we should accept Black English as a legitimate
form of language, as valid and correct as any other, including
Standard English, and begin using Title VII to eradicate dis-
crimination against speakers of Black English.
This may strike most readers as a dangerous abandonment
of standards-isn't mainstream English called "standard" for a
reason? It may also give rise to concerns about an ascent into
the Tower of Babel-wouldn't this lead to the worst possible
type of multiculturalism, a nation so divided that its citizens
cannot even communicate with each other?
I will argue that these fears are misguided or unfounded. In
order to do so, I must first provide some background informa-
tion about human language in general and Black English in
particular. In giving this background in the next Section, I rely
on the work of cognitive scientists and linguists, whose conclu-
sions are often contrary to "common sense."76
Once the common sense view of Black English is abandoned,
the application of Title VII is relatively straightforward. Part
II.C will discuss why discrimination against Black English
should fall under the disparate impact framework and will
then address the possible employer defenses to a Title VII
claim. Given the complexities of Title VII law, this Article
76. As a former cognitive scientist and linguist, I can verify that this is one of the
frustrations of the field.
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cannot possibly address all of the issues that might arise for a
plaintiff who challenges employer discrimination against
Black English. I hope to demonstrate, however, that such a
plaintiff would have a far better chance of winning a Title VII
suit than the "common sense" about Black English would have
us believe.
B. The True Nature of Black English
1. The Linguist's View of Language-Most people think of
language as a cultural invention.77 As with other aspects of
culture, spoken language is thought to come in "higher" and
"lower" varieties. According to this perspective, some individu-
als (those who are more gifted or more educated) speak a
highly complex, expressive language, while others (less gifted
or less educated) speak a simpler, more primitive, error-filled
language."8
According to cognitive scientists, who study the functions of
the human brain, and linguists, who study spoken language as
an example of those functions,79 this view is almost entirely
wrong." Steven Pinker, a professor of cognitive science and
linguistics at MIT, explains why he titled his recent book The
Language Instinct:
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way
we learn to tell time or how the federal government
works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological
77. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 5 (identifying the common belief that
"language is an ethereal, mutable thing, something we learn, something within our
control"); PINKER, supra note 2, at 17 ("Most educated people already have opinions
about language [including the belief that] it is man's most important cultural inven-
tion .. . ).
78. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 51-56.
79. Cognitive (or theoretical) linguistics is the study of language as a function of
the human brain. As a branch of cognitive science, it is closely related to other fields
such as cognitive psychology and neurobiology. Research on Black English often in-
volves both cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics (the study of language in social
context).
80. Cognitive scientists and linguists do make a distinction between spoken lan-
guage and written language. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 18-25 (explaining the
historical, structural, and functional differences between spoken and written lan-
guage). The latter is, partially, an expression of culture. See id. at 20. The arguments
in this Article generally refer to spoken language only. But see infra Part III.C
(discussing how Title VII might also protect speakers of Black English where writing
skills are critical to job performance).
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makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized
skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without
conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without
awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same
in every individual, and is distinct from more general abili-
ties to process information or behave intelligently."'
Thus, "[tihe complexity of language, from the scientist's point
of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something
that parents teach their children or something that must be
elaborated in school ....
To say that "the language function is biological" could easily
lead to a confusion: labeling language "biological" does not
mean that humans are born knowing the particular language
they end up speaking. The French, are not genetically pro-
grammed to speak French or Italians to speak Italian. Black
children in the United States are in no way genetically des-
tined to speak Black English, nor are white children in the
United States genetically destined to speak Standard Eng-
lish.83
One should instead picture a machine built into the brain
that is capable of generating only one basic language with
some minor variations." Those variations result from different
settings or parameters of the basic rules of language which
linguists label phonology, morphology, and syntax. In other
words, the metaphorical language machine has a small set of
toggle switches whose settings correspond to the rather dra-
matic variations in the surface form of languages. These toggle
switches are set by a minimum of language input received
without conscious attention at a very early age.
To give just one example: among other things, phonology
rules determine how the acoustic spectrum will be divided into
identifiable phonemes (the sounds that form words).' Differ-
ent languages divide the acoustic spectrum in different ways;
in other words, they use a different set of phonemes. The
81. PINKER, supra note 2, at 18.
82. Id. at 19.
83. Thus, the Oakland School Board's statement that Black English is
.genetically based" was completely misleading. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text (discussing the board's unfortunate choice of words).
84. The following paragraphs draw upon my own background in cognitive science
and linguistics. For a more detailed and extremely readable discussion, see PINKER,
supra note 2. See also CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION (Mark Aronoff
ed., 1993).
85. See generally PINKER, supra note 2, at 172-81 (discussing phonology rules).
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"toggle switches" for phonemes are set very early, well before a
baby begins to speak. Once set, these switches are very diffi-
cult to reset. One unfortunate result is well-known: no matter
how hard most speakers struggle, they find it difficult to cor-
rectly pronounce a second language that uses a different
phoneme set. For Japanese speakers, this means that the r/1
distinction is very hard to hear or make. For English speakers,
this means that the unaspirated "p" of French or the tonal dis-
tinctions of Chinese are difficult to distinguish or duplicate.
This is why it is so hard to speak a second language without
an accent.
The "toggle switches" for morphology (word structure) and
syntax (sentence structure) are likewise set in response to lan-
guage input at an early age-largely by age three or four.
Overall, the so-called "critical period" for language learning
ends at the onset of puberty, probably in response to biological
factors.' Language learning after this time proceeds in an en-
tirely different manner: after puberty, language learning
involves conscious intellectual labor. As anyone who has ever
studied a second language knows, it is time-consuming, diffi-
cult work-very much in contrast to the easy acquisition of a
first language.
8 7
86. The exact nature of this critical period is still under investigation. See LIPPI-
GREEN, supra note 2, at 248 n.6. Pinker summarizes the current state of understand-
ing among linguists:
In sum, acquisition of a normal language is guaranteed for children up to the
age of six, is steadily compromised from then until shortly after puberty, and is
rare thereafter. Maturational changes in the brain, such as the decline in meta-
bolic rate and number of neurons during the early school-age years, and the
bottoming out of the number of synapses and metabolic rate around puberty,
are plausible causes. We do know that the language-learning circuitry of the
brain is more plastic in childhood; children learn or recover language when the
left hemisphere of the brain is damaged or even surgically removed (though not
quite at normal levels), but comparable damage in an adult usually leads to
permanent aphasia.
PINKER, supra note 2, at 293.
87. Professor Rosina Lippi-Green provides a nice summary of these "linguistic
facts of life":
* There is a finite set of potentially meaning-bearing sounds (vowels,
consonants, tones) which can be produced by human vocal appara-
tus. The set in its entirety is universal, available to all human
beings without physical handicap.
" Each language uses some, but not all, sounds available.
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It is important to understand this terminology correctly: de-
spite the misleading terms "first language" and "second
language," the distinction actually rests on timing, not the
number of languages being learned. In the critical early child-
hood period, when the language machine is active (i.e., when
the language-learning circuitry of the brain is still function-
ing), a child receiving the appropriate language input can
acquire any number of languages and will be able to speak all
of them fluently, without an accent. Each of these would be
considered a "first" language. After puberty, when the lan-
guage machine no longer operates in the same way (i.e., when
the language-learning circuitry of the brain no longer fully
functions), any language learned would be considered a
"second" language.
Of course, languages differ not only with respect to their
rules, but also with respect to their vocabularies. To continue
the metaphor, one can picture learning vocabulary like pop-
ping a tape or a computer disk into the language machine.
Unlike phonology, morphology, or syntax (the "rules" of a lan-
guage), vocabulary is not static. A person can continue to add
to his or her vocabulary for a lifetime.
The various world languages are each defined by their rules
(the "toggle switch" settings) and their vocabularies. More
closely related languages share some settings and vocabulary
words, while more distantly related languages might have
completely different settings and vocabulary. But even lan-
guages that appear to be very different (say, English and
Japanese) can be considered variants of the same basic human
language, because all human languages arise from the brain's
language "machine."
Thus, the common distinction between "language" and
"dialect" carries little meaning for linguists.88 Contrary to the
* Children are born with the ability to produce the entire set of pos-
sible sounds, but eventually restrict themselves to the ones they
hear used around them.
" Children exposed to more than one language during the language
acquisition process may acquire more than one language, if the so-
cial conditioning factors are favorable.
" At some time in adolescence, the ability to acquire language with
the same ease as young children atrophies.
LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 45-46. Her summary focuses on the acquisition of pho-
nology settings, but applies equally well to the acquisition of morphology and syntax
settings.
88. See Pamela Burdman, Ebonics Tests Linguistic Definition, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
26, 1996, at Al. Burdman quotes Wayne O'Neil, chairman of the linguistics and
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popular misconception, a dialect is not a second class version
of a language, and languages are not more "pure" or "correct"
than dialects."5 When linguists distinguish between these two
terms, they use "language" to refer to a group of mutually in-
telligible dialects.' In linguistic terms, everyone speaks one
dialect or another;91 when two dialects are mutually intelligi-
ble, linguists would say that they belong to the same language.
But because mutual intelligibility varies gradually, linguists
do not place particular emphasis on the distinction. In com-
mon usage, by contrast, the choice between the two terms
tends to be based on political grounds (e.g., national bounda-
ries or relative status of speakers) rather than linguistic ones
(similarity of language rules or vocabulary).92 As linguists like
to say, "A language is a dialect with an army and a navy."
93
philosophy department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology- "By and large,
linguist s are not going to get into arguments about what's a language, what's not a
language. Language is not a technical term. It is a political and ideological term." Id.
Although not a technical term among linguists, the label "language" can play a sig-
nificant political role. This was demonstrated in the debate over the Oakland School
Board's resolution on "Ebonics": Because federal bilingual education funding is only
available to support education efforts aimed at children who speak a language other
than English, rather than a dialect other than Standard English, the question
whether Black English should be termed a separate language or a separate dialect of
English (a linguistically uninteresting question) has been treated as highly significant
by the public and the media. See Venise Wagner, US. Won't Pay for "Ebonics" in
School, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 25, 1996, at Al (exploring the relationship between classi-
fication as a language and receipt of federal funds); see also supra note 5 (discussing
Oakland controversy).
89. See Burdman, supra note 88, at Al (discussing common derogatory usage of
term "dialect" and contrasting this usage with the technical linguistic meaning); see
also LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 247-48 n.4 ("Laypersons often associate the word
dialect as something less developed, capable, or worthy, and hence always subordinate
to a language. This is an unfortunate and miscast use of the term.").
90. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 43 (giving a "rough division" of terms
"accent," "dialect," and "language").
91. See Burdman, supra note 88, at Al (quoting John McWhorter, a professor of
linguistics and African-American studies at the University of California at Berkeley).
92. See id.; see also John R. Rickford, Linguistics Society of America (LSA)
Resolution on the Oakland "Ebonics" Issue (last modified Mar. 19, 1997) <http'/lwww-
leland.stanford.edu/-rickford/ebonics/LSAResolution.html> [hereinafter LSA Resolution]
(quoting from a resolution unanimously adopted at the annual meeting of the Linguistic
Society of America in Chicago, Illinois, on Jan. 3, 1997: "The distinction between
languages' and 'dialects' is usually made more on social and political grounds than on
purely linguistic ones. For example, different varieties of Chinese are popularly
regarded as dialects, though their speakers cannot understand each other, but
speakers of Swedish and Norwegian, which are regarded as separate languages,
generally understand each other.").
93. See Burdman, supra note 88; LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 43 ("Max Wein-
reich is widely quoted as pointing out that a language is a dialect with an army and a
navy; I would like to add to that observation that a dialect is perhaps nothing more
than a language that gets no respect.").
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Given this scientific explanation of language, all human
languages (or dialects) must be considered equally valid. No
language is more grammatical than any other, none is intrinsi-
cally more complex, and none is more capable of expressing
thought.' There are no primitive or "Stone Age" languages.95
All spoken languages are a product of the same basic language
machine, with its limited collection of rule settings, and an ar-
bitrary selection of vocabulary.
Why then are some spoken dialects considered "standard,"
"proper," or "correct," while others are relegated to nonstan-
dard status (if they are recognized as dialects at all)? The
answer to this question lies outside the study of language per
se, because "[a]ll linguists agree that [so-called] nonstandard
dialects are highly structured systems; they do not see these
dialects as accumulations of errors caused by the failure of
their speakers to master [the] standard ... ""
The status hierarchy of languages actually reflects social
facts, not linguistic ones.97 The source of a dialect's status is
the status of the dialect's speakers, not the dialect's inherent
qualities. Nonstandard dialects are those whose speakers have
been relegated to marginal positions in their societies:98 "[a]s
has always been the case in the United States, and in most
other nations, those who are in positions of political power and
social control dictate the standards of linguistic acceptability."9
94. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 11-14 (explaining why all spoken lan-
guages are equal in linguistic terms). Critical to understanding this point is the
realization that all languages change over time, both in terms of their grammar and
their vocabulary. See id. at 10. All languages are flexible enough to develop vocabulary
in order to express new concepts: if speakers of a dialect in some isolated community
in Tibet suddenly needed to discuss the Internet, for example, they would be fully
capable of doing so in their dialect. See id. at 11-12.
95. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 27.
96. William Labov, The Logic of Nonstandard English, in LANGUAGE, SOCIETY,
AND EDUCATION: A PROFILE OF BLACK ENGLISH 10, 40 (Johanna S. DeStefano ed.,
1973).
97. See generally LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2 (discussing sources and effects of
status differences among dialects).
98. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 9; LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 53-62; see also
Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, Foreword to EDITH A. FOLB, RUNNIN' DOWN SOME LINES:
THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF BLACK TEENAGERS at xv, xvii (1980) ("Across the
United States, through the influence of formal education and the mass media, differ-
ences between regional dialects are waning. Differences between social dialects,
however, remain quite marked and in fact may reflect the entrenchment of the class
system of our society.").
99. BAUGH, supra note 70, at 30; cf Robert L. Politzer, Problems in Applying For-
eign Language Teaching Methods to the Teaching of Standard English as a Second
Dialect, in LANGUAGE, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION: A PROFILE OF BLACK ENGLISH, supra
note 96, at 238, 243 (questioning the distinction between "permissible variations" and
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Those who study this phenomenon often use the term
"Standard Language Ideology," defined as "a bias toward an
abstracted, idealized, homogenous spoken language which is
imposed and maintained by dominant bloc institutions and
which names as its model the written language, but which is
drawn primarily from the spoken language of the upper mid-
dle class.""® Standard Language Ideology is based on a number
of myths. The most important of these is the myth that Stan-
dard English is somehow distinct in quality from all other
American dialects.1 '1 Indeed, common usage rejects the term
"dialect" for Standard English for this very reason, in a move
akin to denying that whites have a particular ethnicity or that
males have a particular gender."° A related myth holds that
Standard English itself is unchanging and without variation.
10 3
In reality even the dialect we call Standard English is an ab-
straction: it permits regional variation, as long as this
variation occurs within a primarily white, middle- or upper-
middle-class community.'"
Symptomatic of the prejudice in favor of the Standard
English dialect is the fact that, just as some dialects are
more equal than others, some differences are more different
than others. Where two varieties of a language 5 (or the
speakers of two varieties) have equal social status, differ-
"substandard speech"). Politzer, in discussing the difficulty of defining what is
"standard" in order to teach Standard English, notes: "Sociological criteria would be
based on the simple recognition that for some strange and often undefinable reasons
certain pronunciations are associated with ignorance and are considered substandard
while others are not." Id. at 244. But the reasons are not really "strange" and
"undefinable"-they are simply not linguistic.
100. LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 64.
101. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 53-62 (explaining the standard language
myth); see also id. at 6 ("There is a common conception that there is a good English,
and following from that, bad English.").
102. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1361 ("[Elveryone has a gender, but the hidden
norm in law is male.... [E]veryone has a race, but the hidden norm in law is white
.... And so it is with accent .... People in power are perceived as speaking normal,
unaccented English. Any speech that is different from that constructed norm is called
an accent."); see also Flagg, supra note 1, at 957 (introducing the concept of "Transpar-
ency Phenomenon" in the context of Equal Protection law); cf Barbara J. Flagg, Fash-
ioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104
YALE L.J. 2009, 2019 n.9 (1995) (discussing the "Transparency Phenomenon," by
which only blacks have a race-whites, and white norms, are thus rendered
"transparent' and neutral).
103. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that contrary to common un-
derstanding, "[v]ariation is intrinsic to all spoken language at every level').
104. See id. at 53-62.
105. Because laypersons often use the term "dialect" in a pejorative way, some lin-
guists prefer the term "variety." See id. at 247-48 n.4.
[VOL. 31:3
Against Common Sense
ences between the two varieties may be the source of comment
but never derision.
For example, phonological differences between the variety of
English spoken on the East Coast and that spoken on the West
Coast mean that some speakers distinguish the pronunciation
of "Mary," "merry," and "marry," while other speakers do not."°
Although the difference in pronunciation is quite noticeable,
no one derides speakers of either variety for their pronuncia-
tion."° Because speakers of these two varieties have roughly
equal status in our society, hearers recognize this difference as
a mark of diversity, not deficiency. Indeed, Standard English is
understood to include both varieties.
British English provides a more general example. Because
Standard British English carries very high status in the
United States, speakers of American English consistently rec-
ognize that it is simply another possible dialect of the English
language family. No one would accuse a British English
speaker of poor language skills simply because he or she pro-
nounces words differently than American speakers."8 This
acceptance extends beyond mere phonological differences. For
example, speakers of American English would never produce
sentences such as "the government have failed to solve the
problem" or "the committee have forwarded the suggestion,"
but they can recognize that British English speakers who do
produce such sentences are not failing to speak proper Eng-
lish-they are simply following the rules of British English."9
In fact, when an outside dialect has high enough status
within a second dialect community, speakers of the second
dialect may accept the other so thoroughly that they fail to ac-
knowledge any differences at all. This explains why a
columnist rejecting Black English could argue that blacks
106. See id. at 27. The same phonological difference between dialects determines
whether a speaker distinguishes between "cot" and "caught" and "hock" and "hawk."
Id.
107. I know this from personal experience: my college friends who spoke the East
Coast dialect enjoyed having me (a West Coast dialect speaker) attempt to pronounce
this trio of words with distinct vowels. The fact that I was unable to do so amused
them, but they never suggested that my pronunciation was incorrect.
108. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 239 ("Immigrants from the British Isles
who speak varieties of English which cause significant communication problems are
not stigmatized: the differences are noted with great interest, and sometimes with
laughter.").
109. See CRYSTAL, supra note 5, at 311 (explaining the difference between British
and American English number agreement rules).
SPRING 19981
660 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
should strive instead to speak "King's English""--despite the
fact that no native-born American actually speaks that dialect.
Listeners interpret language differences quite differently
where two dialects have unequal status. While Americans fred
British accents unproblematic, if not charming, they react
negatively to differences "linked to skin that isn't white, or
which signals a third-world homeland.""' Ironically, perhaps,
the reaction of some British citizens to American English can
exemplify this point as well: since American English does not
carry such high status in Britain as British English carries in
the United States, some British English speakers do believe
that American speech patterns are improper-that they repre-
sent a faulty version of "pure" English."2
Within the United States, certain varieties of American
English elicit equally negative reactions. For example, a pho-
nological distinction equivalent to that which produces the
"Mary," "merry," "marry" contrast means that speakers of a
Southern variety of English pronounce "pin" and "pen" the
same way, while speakers of the Northern varieties distinguish
them (in the Southern variety, short "i" and "e" are pronounced
similarly when they precede nasal consonants). Once again,
this difference simply represents diversity; there is nothing
intrinsically correct about either type of phonological rule. But
because the Southern variety has lower status, this difference
elicits both comment and derision, which then causes shame
among Southern speakers who try to "correct" their pronuncia-
tion.1
3
Status differences also explain why Americans are often
more tolerant of foreign accents than of ethnic or regional
"accents" (i.e., dialect differences)."' A purely linguistic
110. Page, supra note 20.
111. LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 238.
112. See Letter from Professor Ted Briscoe, University of Cambridge, to author
(Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Ac-
cording to Professor Briscoe, a British linguist with a British sense of humor, "[n]early
all Brits think Yanks speak a substandard dialect of English-even those poor sods
who speak a substandard dialect of British English, i.e., everyone who doesn't use
'received' pronunciation or public (in the British sense) school English."
113. See generally David Williford, A Pin Is Not a Pen; Is a Pan? Is Southern Pro-
nunciation Incorrect?, ENG. J., Oct. 1988, at 25, 28.
114. Dr. Doris F. Weisberg, chair of the Speech Department at City College in New
York, notes that "Americans are more tolerant of language differences among newly
arrived immigrants." Roberts, supra note 14, at B1. In addition, "employers and teach-
ers tend to forgive foreign-born children or adults for incorrect pronunciations, but
because of racism they do not forgive black people." Nicklin, supra note 60. The par-
ticular status of the foreign language speaker also plays a role: Americans tend to be
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analysis would suggest the opposite reaction: A foreign accent
(or "L2" accent) arises when a speaker continues to apply
(subconsciously) the rules of a first language when speaking a
second.115 Thus, it is accurate to say that these individuals
speak the second language incorrectly. By contrast, people
with regional "accents" (or "LI" accents) are not speaking a
second language (the so-called standard dialect) incorrectly;
rather, they are applying the rules of their first language (a
nonstandard dialect) correctly. But once again, social prejudice,
rather than linguistic fact, often controls our perception of
language differences.
Just how faulty our perceptions of language difference can
be has been shown by studies of intelligibility. For example,
one experiment showed that undergraduate students who
believed they had heard an Asian instructor give a lecture
not only rated her speech as more accented than that of a
control lecturer, they also scored more poorly on a subsequent
comprehension exam-although the taped lecture that they
had heard was made by the same non-Asian speaker who
made the control tape.11 In general, linguists have found that
the ability of a speaker to communicate successfully is par-
tially dependent on the listeners' active participation; if a
listener (unconsciously) rejects her portion of the communi-
cative burden, she will perceive the speaker as less
intelligible-regardless of the actual characteristics of the
far more accepting of a French or German accent, for example, than a Mexican one.
See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 238-39.
115. For example, an English speaker may subconsciously apply English syntax
rules when speaking German, and therefore fail to place the German verb in the
proper position within a sentence. English speakers speaking German with a strong
English accent might say, for example, "Er sagte, daB er liebt seine Frau" ("He said
that he loved his wife," following English word order rules) rather than "Er sagte, daB
er seine Frau liebt" ("He said that he his wife loved," following German word order
rules). See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 42-43 (explaining the difference between an
"Li" accent-which simply marks which variety of English is being spoken-and an
"L2" accent-which represents a breakthrough of the speaker's first language into the
second language).
116. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 126-27 (describing findings reported in
Donald L. Rubin & Kim A. Smith, Effects of Accent, Ethnicity, and Lecture Topic on
Undergraduates' Perceptions of Non-Native English Speaking Teaching Assistants, 14
INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 337 (1990): Students saw one of two possible photo-
graphs representing the instructor-one showing a Caucasian woman and the other
an Asian woman and heard two possible lectures, one on a science topic and the other
on a humanities topic recorded by the same person, a native speaker of English from
central Ohio).
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speaker's speech.'17 In other words, "[intelligibility is a
highly subjective criterion.""8
Although the preceding discussion applies most directly to
spoken language, it has implications for our understanding of
written language as well. Given that children acquire most
features of their first language (excluding vocabulary) well be-
fore they reach school age,"' the purpose of classes labeled
"English" or "Language Arts" cannot actually be to teach chil-
dren language. Rather, these classes teach reading and
writing. In particular, they teach the use of Standard Written
English.
From a linguistic perspective, Standard (Spoken) English
and Standard Written English are two very different things.2 '
Standard Written English is a cultural construct which no one
learns as a first language: it does not arise directly from the
brain's "language machine." Of course, those students whose
first language is most similar to Standard Written English are
able to learn Standard Written English skills much more eas-
ily than those whose first language is less similar.12' It is no
surprise to learn that the dialect most closely related to Stan-
dard Written English is Standard (Spoken) English: the same
power relations that determined the choice of Standard Eng-
lish as the "normal" dialect also led to the choice of Standard
English as a basis for the standard written form.
2. The Linguist's View of Black English-Black English is
not bad grammar, and it is certainly not "a linguistic sham
that, with porcine gluttony, vacuum-sucks every verbal de-
formity from plantation patois to black slang, from rap to hip
hop, from jive to crippled English"-as one outraged commen-
117. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 70-71.
118. EINAR HAUGEN, BLESSINGS OF BABEL: BILINGUALISM AND LANGUAGE
PLANNING 16 (1987); see also William F. Mackey, Bilingual Education and Its Social
Implications, in LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, POLICIES AND PLURALISM 151, 157 (John
Edwards ed., 1984) (noting that in highly bilingual areas, "speakers will admit to un-
derstanding the language of highest status and not to understanding an inferior
although closely related dialect of their mother tongue"). See generally ATTITUDES
TOWARD LANGUAGE VARIATION (E. Ryan & H. Giles eds., 1982).
119. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 123; see also supra notes 86-87 and accom-
panying text (discussing the "critical period" for language learning, which is largely
completed before age six).
120. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 18-25 (explaining why "written language
and spoken language are historically, structurally, and functionally fundamentally
different creatures").
121. See infra note 313 and accompanying text (discussing studies showing im-
proved reading skills of Black English speakers who use textbooks based on Black
English dialect, rather than Standard English dialect).
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tator insisted, after the Oakland School Board decided to offi-
cially recognize what it labeled "Ebonics."' 22 Rather, Black
English is just one of many human languages.12 In purely lin-
guistic terms, it has exactly the same status as Standard
English, "King's English," or, for that matter, Hochdeutsch.
Like all other languages worldwide, it is a product of the
brain's specialized language-learning circuitry and can be de-
fined in terms of its phonology, morphology, and syntax rules,
as well as its vocabulary.'
24
This view is absolutely noncontroversial among linguists.
12 5
When the Linguistic Society of America passed a resolution in
support of the Oakland School Board's decision, explaining
that Black English is "systematic and rule-governed like all
natural speech varieties" and that characterizations such as
"'slang,' 'mutant,' 'lazy,' 'defective,' 'ungrammatical,' or 'broken
English"' are incorrect, the vote was unanimous. 6 This view
of Black English is "not PC [politically correct], it's scientific
fact."1
27
122. Shaw, supra note 5, at B9. It should be noted that Mr. Shaw, a consultant for
the Los Angeles Office of Education, is himself black. This exemplifies two points
made earlier: that the common sense view of Black English is prevalent in both black
and white communities and that strong negative reactions to Black English often
come from the black community itself. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
123. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 29-31 (discussing Black English as a fully com-
plex dialect/language); see also LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 176-201 (same); Pullum,
supra note 5, at 321 (noting AAE's consistent grammar and pronounciation); LSA
Resolution, supra note 92 (recognizing Black English as a systematic, rule-governed
language variety).
124. A vast amount of linguistics literature concerns the origins and structure of
Black English. See, e.g., AFRICAN AMERICAN ENGLISH (Salikoko S. Mufwene et al. eds.,
forthcoming); BAUGH, supra note 70; ROBBINS BURLING, ENGLISH IN BLACK AND WHITE
(1973); DILLARD, supra note 5; LABOV, supra note 5; JOHN R. RICKFORD & LISA A. GREEN,
AFRICAN AMERICAN VERNACULAR ENGLISH (forthcoming); GENEVA SMITHERMAN, BLACK
TALK: WORDS AND PHRASES FROM THE HOOD TO THE AMEN CORNER (1994); GENEVA
SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TESTIFYIN: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK AMERICA (1986);
TAYLOR, supra note 62; WALTER A. WOLFRAM, A SOCIO-LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTION OF
DETROIT NEGRO SPEECH (1969); Geneva Smitherman, "It Bees Dat Way Sometime:"
Sounds and Structure of Present Day Black English, in LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTORY
READINGS 552 (Virginia P. Clark et al. eds., 1985).
125. See Pullum, supra note 5, at 321 ("[Elssentially all linguists agree that [Black
English] is a dialect of English.").
126. LSA Resolution, supra note 92; see also Ron Emmons, Black English Has Its
Place, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at B13 (noting that the American Speech, Language,
and Hearing Association classifies Black English as a "legitimate social dialect with
unique lexicon, grammar, phonology, syntax and semantics").
127. Judy Pasternak, Linguists Praise Oakland's Plan to Use Ebonics, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1997, at Al (quoting Gregory Ward, a Northwestern University linguist who
serves on the executive committee of the 6,000-member Linguistic Society of Amer-
ica). As linguist Geoffrey Pullum observes, a linguists' view can hardly be dismissed as
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The Black English dialect developed through a complex
process called "creolization." When three or more languages
first come into contact, speakers often create what is called a
"pidgin" language. This is not a true language, because it lacks
the complexity of other languages; it does not arise from the
brain's language "machine." Rather, a pidgin system is a sort of
shorthand, based on the languages that have come into contact
with one another, which allows limited communication among
speakers of those languages. The next step of the creolization
process is rather fascinating: children who are exposed to the
pidgin as their only form of communication transform it, filling
in the linguistic gaps to create a new language called a creole.2
Why children? Because only children are still in the critical
period of language learning, when the language "machine" is
still operating. It is this "machine" (the specialized language-
learning circuitry of the brain) that enables them to expand
the pidgin into a complete language. In fact, linguists specu-
late that the rules of creoles, which are strikingly similar
worldwide, reflect the basic, or default, settings of the "toggle
switches." This is one reason why linguists are especially in-
terested in creoles.
This process has occurred many times around the world.30
In particular, creolization occurred when slaves were pur-
"just left wing propaganda," because "[elven conservative linguists acknowledge the
facts [regarding Black English." See Pullum, supra note 5, at 322.
128. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 16-17; DILLARD, supra note 5, at 6; PINKER, su-
pra note 2, at 32-39; Traugott, supra note 5, at 58; Introduction to Section II: The
History of Black English, in PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK ENGLISH 91 (J. Dillard ed., 1975).
129. See generally LORETO TODD, PIDGINS AND CREOLES (2d ed. 1990) (examining
through detailed study the transformation from pidgin to creole); David DeCamp,
Introduction: The Study of Pidgin and Creole Languages, in PIDGINIZATION AND
CREOLIZATION OF LANGUAGES 13 (Dell Hymes ed., 1971) (describing the metamorpho-
sis of pidgin into creole). Professor Lippi-Green summarizes the difference between a
pidgin and a creole:
A pidgin has no native speakers, and is reduced, with simplified morphological
and syntactical features taken from the contributing languages. Pidgins can
exist over long periods of time. A creole is something very different. When
pidgin speakers settle down in close proximity to each other and when children
are born into a setting in which pidgin is spoken, they take the raw data of the
pidgin and in the process of language acquisition they expand it into a fully
functioning language.
LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 248 n.5.
130. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 36-39. Pinker offers Hawaiian creole as one ex-
ample of creolization. See id. at 34. He also describes how deaf children in various
countries around the world developed full sign languages (which like spoken lan-
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posely grouped so that they would not share a native lan-
guage, in order to reduce the possibility of revolt.131 When
slavery was first established in the United States, slaves used
a pidgin based on English and their native African languages
to communicate."3 2 Children born into this pidgin-speaking
community, in the process of language learning, developed the
pidgin spoken by their parents into a full creole language-in
essence, Black English.'3 3 Their children's children, and so on,
learned Black English just as every child learns whatever lan-
guage he or she is exposed to during the critical period for
language learning.
This explanation may sound bizarre to a non-linguist. It is
apparently easy to misunderstand the nature of creolization-
the common sense view can block understanding. Consider, for
example, the following erroneous summary: "Linguists say the
[Black English] dialect represents the remnants of West Afri-
can languages used by American slaves and the efforts of those
slaves--denied formal education-to mimic white people."'3"
This summary is wrong for a number of reasons. First of all,
slaves' lack of formal education is irrelevant to the language
learning process, since language acquisition does not normally
occur at school-the vast majority of the language acquisition
process occurs long before children are old enough for formal
schooling.3 3 Second, Black English did not result from blacks'
attempts to "mimic" whites. Black children created Black Eng-
lish from the adults' pidgin system without conscious effort
and without any need for exposure to Standard English. These
children were not copying a language badly-they were creat-
ing a new language.
Although it accepted the validity of Black English as a lan-
guage, the Oakland School Board resolution also expressed a
number of confusions about the origins of Black English. By
labeling Black English "Pan-African Communication Behavior"
and "African Language Systems" and by stating that "African
guages, are products of the brain's language "machine") from pidgin sign systems. See
id. at 36-39.
131. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 13.
132. See DILLARD, supra note 5, at 74-75.
133. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 16.
134. Lee, supra note 14, at D22.
135. The writer apparently believes that if adult slaves had been taught Standard
English as a second language, they would have then taught Standard English to their
children. This may be true, but it in no way relates to the actual development of Black
English.
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Language Systems are ... not a dialect of English,"136 the
board suggested that Black English is correctly seen as an Af-
rican language. This is inaccurate: to say that Black English
has some of its roots in African languages spoken by slaves is
not to say that Black English is an African language. Indeed,
linguists debate just how many features of modern Black Eng-
lish can be traced to African languages."' As a creole based on
English, Black English has always been a member of the Eng-
lish language family.
1 38
Because they are closely related dialects of English, Black
English and Standard English have very similar vocabularies.
Some speakers of Black English-usually younger ones-do
draw from a different vocabulary than that used by Standard
English speakers in order to express group solidarity; when
they do so, it is accurate to say that these speakers are using
"slang."139 However, this slang is no more equivalent to Black
English than "valley speak" is equivalent to Standard English.""
The distinction between Standard English and Black Eng-
lish does not lie primarily in vocabulary differences but rather
in the two dialects' phonology, morphology, and syntax. The
differences a listener hears are the result of these different
language rules (i.e., different settings for the phonology, mor-
phology, and syntax "toggle switches" in the brain's language
"machine"). Black English does not sound different from Stan-
dard English because it fails to follow the rules of Standard
English; it sounds different because it follows its own, equally
valid, rules. Indeed, the fact that Black English is rule-based,
136. EBONICS-The Oakland Resolution, supra note 5 (reprinting original reso-
lution).
137. See, e.g., AFRICANISMS IN AFRo-AMERICAN LANGUAGE VARIETIES (Salikoko S.
Mufwene ed., 1993).
138. See Traugott, supra note 5, at 58. It is also important to note that modern
day Black English is not the same as the initial creole; like all languages, Black Eng-
lish has changed and developed over time. In particular, Black English has undergone
a partial process of "decreolization." See id. at 61 (explaining that over the centuries
Black English has adopted some of the rules of Standard English, causing the two
languages to become more similar).
139. See generally Mitchell-Kernan, supra note 98 (reporting findings of study on
black teens' use of slang).
140. See LSA Resolution, supra note 92 (asserting that Black English is not
equivalent to slang). This is a point missed by most of the commentators reacting to
the "Ebonics" decision in Oakland. See supra note 7; see, e.g., Asimov & Olszewski,
supra note 22 (noting Shelby Steele's insistence that Black English is "merely slang");
Jackson Assails "Ebonics" Policy, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 23, 1996, at A2 (quoting Jesse
Jackson: "[In Oakland some madness has erupted over making slang talk a second
language."); Debra J. Saunders, Oakland's Ebonics Farce, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 1996,
at A15 (arguing that the Oakland decision "elevates slang").
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rather than a random collection of errors, should be obvious
from its very recognizability as Black English.' 1 This is why
the applicant in the Introduction could be identified as black
from just a few sample sentences.
Some examples may make this explanation more clear."4
The differences in word pronunciation in Black English re-
sult from a different set of phonological rules (different from
Standard English, that is, but shared by many world lan-
guages). "Test" is pronounced "tes" in Black English because
a regular phonological rule (one that operates subconsciously,
as part of the language "machine") reduces two-consonant
clusters at the end of a word.143 The rule can only operate
when the two final consonants are either both "voiceless"-as
in "test"-or both voiced-as in "hand."'" If one of the two
consonants is voiced and the other unvoiced (as in "pant")
then the rule does not apply ("pant" would never be pro-
nounced "pan" in Black English).' 5  This complicated
phonological rule then interacts in a complex way with the
rules of morphology (word structure): where a final "t" or "d"
phoneme marks the past tense on a verb, it is not reduced.
141. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
142. For other examples, see BAUGH, supra note 70, at 80-81 (explaining that the
stressed "been" in Black English, as in "we been lived here," means "we have lived
here for some time and continue to do so"); ORR, supra note 17, at 121-32 (discussing
differences in closed class words such as prepositions); Ralph W. Fasold & Walt Wolf-
ram, Some Linguistic Features of Negro Dialect, in LANGUAGE, SOCIETY, AND
EDUCATION: A PROFILE OF BLACK ENGLISH, supra note 96, at 116, 141-45 (discussing
possessives, plurals, question formation, and "existential it" as in "it be a boy in my
room name Robert" for "there is a boy in my room named Robert"); Joan G. Fickett,
Ain't, Not, and Don't in Black English, in PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK ENGLISH, supra
note 49, at 86 (discussing the verb tense system of Black English); Labov, supra note
96, at 33-34 (discussing question formation); Peter Sells et al., Negative Inversion in
African American Vernacular English, 14 NAT. LANGUAGE & LINGUISTIC THEORY 591
(1996) (analyzing complex negative inversion construction, which reverses order of
negative quantifier and auxiliary-"Nobody can't" becomes "Can't nobody"-to pro-
duce emphatic affirmative); Traugott, supra note 5, at 86-93 (discussing how various
features of Black English fit with its creole source); Acson, supra note 54, at A18
(comparing other world languages to show that Black English is not anomalous:
"Arabic and Hebrew both have a possessive form that has no marking on the posses-
sive noun .... Oral French has no marked plural form (Jour' is day and days).").
143. See Fasold & Wolfram, supra note 142, at 117-20 (discussing reduction of
word-final consonant clusters in Black English).
144. A "voiced" phoneme is one that requires vocal cord vibration; an "unvoiced"
phoneme requires no vocal cord vibration. The difference can be felt by touching the
throat while saying either "d" (voiced) or "t" (unvoiced).
145. See Ebonics Notes and Discussion (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http://www-
leland.stanford.edu/-rickford/ebonics /EbonicsExamples.html> (thanks to John Rick-
ford for this example).
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Thus, in Black English "past" is pronounced "pas," but
"passed" would never be pronounced "pas."'4 5
Similarly, systematic phonological rules produce the famous
"aks" for "ask," "tin" for "thin," and "toof" for "tooth," as well as
the so-called "dropped 'g'" in words like "workin" and
'writin." 147 The label "dropped 'g'" for the last variation is a
particularly nice example of the common confusion between
spoken and written language. Although we write "working"
with seven letters and "workin" with six, the pronunciation
difference does not actually result from "dropping a 'g"; it
results from substituting one phoneme, [n], for another, [D].141
Once again, this phonological alteration is itself constrained by
the rules of morphology (word structure): where "ing" is part of
the root word, rather than a suffix, the alteration does not
apply ("ring" would never be pronounced "rin" in Black
English).!4 9
Thus, these pronunciations in no way represent laziness or
ignorance on the part of the speaker. All human languages al-
low such phonological alterations because they maximize ease
of articulation. In each case, however, the pronunciation is the
product of a complicated but unconscious language rule: "[No
dialect allows its speakers to cut [phonological] corners at
will."
15 0
Furthermore, forms like "we be writing grant proposals" do
not result from a failure to put the verb into its proper tensed
form. In Black English, this is a tense (one not available in
Standard English). It corresponds to a durative meaning; in
other words, it means that the action specified by the verb con-
tinues over time.'
146. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 97-98 (explaining that the final consonant re-
duction rule affects the pronunciation of words like "past," "cold," or "test," but where
the "t" or "d" phoneme marks the past tense, it is not reduced).
147. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 27-28, 179-80 (explaining "aks' and
"dropped 'g'"); Fasold & Wolfram, supra note 142, at 120-29 (discussing "th" sounds,
nasalization rules (loss of "g"), and plural and past tense markers); William G. Moul-
ton, The Sounds of Black English, in BLACK ENGLISH: A SEMINAR, supra note 5, at
149, 155-56 (explaining "th" rules and the "loss of 'g").
148. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 27.
149. See id. at 28.
150. PINKER, supra note 2, at 180.
151. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 71 (Invariant "be" is not untensed; it occurs "in
habitual contexts where events are nonpast or incompleted" or when the sentence has
a durative meaning because the action referred to extends over a certain period of




This example in particular demonstrates that Black English
is not an impoverished version of Standard English. Because
the rules of Black English allow deletion of the "be" verb form
where the sentence does not have a durative meaning, the two
sentences "she be working" and "she working" carry different
meanings."2 The first means that she generally works (she has
a regular job), while the second can only mean that she is
working at the moment. Standard English fails to make this
distinction.
The "be" deletion rule is also a source of misunderstanding.
As with phonological variations such as the so-called "dropped
'g,'" critics often assume that speakers "carelessly" or
"sloppily" leave out the "be" verb form.'53 The truth is just the
opposite: a set of very complicated but unconscious rules gov-
ern when "be" may be omitted in Black English. The "be" verb
form cannot be omitted if it is stressed (as it always is at the
end of a phrase); it cannot be omitted if it is negated; and it
cannot be omitted if it is in the past tense.'5 Thus, "he good"
can only mean "he is good." Arabic, Hungarian, Russian, and
other languages have a very similar rule.'55
Finally, the so-called "double negative" of Black English is
no more illogical than the Standard English negative.'56 Both
dialects show what linguists call "negative concord" or agree-
ment between indefinite determiners and a negative element
in the sentence (such as "not" or "never"). Negative concord is
a grammatical rule, very much like gender or number agree-
ment between nouns and verbs.'57 In Standard English,
negative concord is shown by using the determiner "any," as in
"I did not have any problems with any of the computers." In
Black English, negative concord is shown using the determiner
"no," as in "I did not have no problems with no computers."
These sentences mean the same thing, and they are equally
complex and logical.
In fact, the Black English rule for negative concord is the
more common rule among languages worldwide. It was the
152. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 30.
153. See Pullum, supra note 5, at 321.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 321-22.
156. See BAUGH, supra note 70, at 82-83 (explaining that so-called multiple nega-
tion is actually a rule of agreement, which operates in both Black English and
Standard English); PINKER, supra note 2, at 375-77 (same); Fasold & Wolfram, supra
note 142, at 137 (same); Labov, supra note 96, at 30-32 (same); Pullum, supra note 5,
at 321 (same).
157. See Pullum, supra note 5, at 321.
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form English took at the time of Chaucer's Middle English,6 5
and "Itihe Anglo-Saxon authors of the Peterborough Chronicle
were surely not illogical when they wrote For ne waeren nan
martyrs swa pined alse he waeren, literally 'For never weren't
no martyrs so tortured as these were.'"159 The Black English
rule of negative concord is the same rule followed by hundreds
of other languages,'" including Russian, Spanish, French, and
Hungarian. 1"
An Italian speaker who says "Non ha telefonata nessuno,"
(literally, "not has telefoned no one")'62 would never be asked
"doesn't that mean that somebody did call?" But Black English
speakers are often ridiculed by Standard English speakers
with questions like "if you 'didn't have no problems,' doesn't
that mean that'you did have some problems?" Standard Eng-
lish speakers make this error because they fail to recognize
difference as diversity where that difference is correlated with
lower status.
Because Standard English and Black English share a large
vocabulary and many language rules, they are mutually intel-
ligible. The differences between the two dialects are recogniz-
able, but they do not impede communication significantly.'63
The negative concord construction provides a perfect example:
Standard English speakers can deride a Black English speaker
for saying "I never had no problems" precisely because they
know exactly what the speaker means. Similarly, Standard
English speakers are able to follow Alice Walker's book The
Color Purple, although much of the dialogue in that book is
written in Black English,"6 and they are able to understand
the speech of television characters who use Black English.'"
This is why observers often refer to a "black accent": the dif-
ference between Black English and Standard English has
158. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 376.
159. Labov, supra note 96, at 31 (emphasis in original).
160. See PINKER, supra note 2, at 376.
161. See Labov, supra note 96, at 32.
162. See Pullurn, supra note 5, at 321 (giving example of negative concord in Ital-
ian). This Italian sentence would be expressed "ain't nobody called" in Black English.
163. See Labov, supra note 96, at 32-34 (contrasting superficial linguistic differ-
ences with deeper correspondences in structure, logic, and meaning).
164. See Sonya Live: Black English, supra note 12 (Professor June Jordan notes that
Standard English speakers can read and follow Alice Walker's book The Color Purple).
165. See Marlene G. Fine & Carolyn Anderson, Dialectical Features of Black
Characters in Situation Comedies on Television, 41 PHYLON 396 (1980) (documenting
use of Black English features on television programs).
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approximately the same effect on the Standard English lis-
tener as a mild foreign accent.'
Crucially, however, the relationship between two such
closely related dialects as Standard English and Black English
is asymmetrical: speakers of each dialect can understand the
other dialect without being able to produce it themselves.6 7 An
experiment conducted by the linguist William Labov illus-
trates this phenomenon well. Labov asked speakers of Black
English to repeat statements that involved sentence-internal
questions (a construction handled differently by the syntax
rules in the two dialects). ' 68 The Black English speakers uni-
formly understood the sentences they were asked to repeat,
but were often unable to repeat them word-for-word. Instead,
they would restate the sentences using Black English syntax
rules. For example, they repeated the statement "I asked Alvin
if he could go" as "I asked Alvin could he go" and the statement
"I asked Alvin whether he knows how to play basketball" as "I
asked Alvin whether-did he know how to play basketball."6 9
In other words, they understood the Standard English sen-
tences and then translated them into Black English. Both
Black English speakers and Standard English speakers have
this asymmetrical competence, which allows understanding or
reception in both dialects, but production only in one.
Acquiring symmetrical competence, or the ability to speak
both dialects fluently, is extremely difficult. An adult or
teenage speaker of Black English who wants to speak
Standard English must learn it as a second language. This is a
difficult task: "The biological and mental obstacles to the
acquisition of two languages can be overcome [once a speaker
is past puberty] only with a heavy expenditure of social and
psychological energy."
170
166. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing dialect differences
and accent).
167. See Labov, supra note 96, at 32-34 (explaining asymmetric relationship be-
tween Black English and Standard English).
168. See LABOV, supra note 5, at 62.
169. See id.
170. J.A. LAPONCE, LANGUAGES AND THEIR TERRITORIES 21 (Anthony Martin-
Sperry trans., 2d ed. 1987); see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the "critical period"
for language learning); PINKER, supra note 2, at 290-93 (explaining why second lan-
guage acquisition is difficult in adulthood); Michael H. Long, Maturational
Constraints on Language Development, 12 STUD. IN SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
251 (1990) (describing near impossibility of losing accent of first language when
speaking a second language).
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One would think that this task would be easier than usual
in this context because the two languages (or dialects) are so
similar. But in fact the similarities between Black English and
Standard English may make the process harder, not easier,
because they make it difficult to identify the differences and
keep them straight. Studies in phonetics have shown that the
more alike two languages are, the more difficult it actually is
for language learners to successfully target the new sounds.
171
Thus, to require a Black English speaker to "just speak proper
English" may be just as demanding as to require him or her to
"just speak French."7
The easiest aspect of "code-switching"' between Black
English and Standard English is the switch in vocabularies.
One researcher observes:
[V]ernacular vocabulary is closely monitored... on the job.
For many, the white man's world is alienating and intimi-
dating, a place to be on guard .... This can mean adopting
the linguistic behavior of the white world (and hiding one's
own). As one teenager put it, "When you get a job, you got
have good language. I try to make a good impression.
" 174
Many Black English speakers are skilled at lexical (i.e.,
word-level) code switching and can utilize a more "standard"
lexicon while at work. 7 1 Since the core vocabularies of Black
English and Standard English are so similar, this largely en-
tails refraining from speaking "slang."
7
171. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 248 n.9 (citing three recent studies).
172. Politzer, supra note 99 at 239. Lippi-Green points out that seeming excep-
tions to this rule, such as comedian Eddie Murphy, who can speak both Standard
English and Black English (among other dialects), are actually not exceptions because
they learned multiple dialects as children during the "critical period" for language
learning. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 49.
173. "Code-switching" refers to the ability to speak differently depending on con-
text. Bidialectal speakers can switch between a standard and nonstandard dialect;
bilingual speakers may switch between two quite different languages. The switch may
occur at the level of individual words (e.g., when a speaker substitutes a Spanish word
for an English one in the midst of a conversation in English) or may involve a com-
plete shift to a second language or dialect. See generally WILLIAM LABOV, THE SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION OF ENGLISH IN NEW YORK CITY (1966) (discussing code-switching phe-
nomenon); Roger Shuy, Aspects of Language Variability and Two Areas of Application,
in DIALECT AND LANGUAGE VARIATION 381, 388-89 (Harold B. Allen & Michael D. Linn
eds., 1986) (giving examples of code-switching).
174. Mitchell-Kernan, supra note 98, at 213.
175. See id.
176. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (explaining the difference be-
tween Black English and slang).
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Other types of code switching are far more difficult because
they involve the subconscious operation of language rules. Ac-
cording to Dorothy Reynolds, head of Wisconsin's Action Group
for the Recognition of Black English Vernacular (BEV): "There
are black folks who will tell me they don't speak BEV .... You
can't tell people, 'Yes, they do.' They don't even hear them-
selves doing it."'77
Of course, the difficulty here goes both ways: "It would be
just as difficult for standard speakers to master [Black Eng-
lish] as it is for black vernacular speakers to learn the
standard."17 Indeed, at least one study has demonstrated the
many mistakes Standard English speakers make when they
do try to speak Black English.'79 But because speakers of
Standard English have the political and economic power to de-
fine their own dialect as "standard," no one requires them to
accomplish this difficult task: they need not worry that their
dialect exposes them to employment discrimination.
C. Applying Title VII to Protect Black
English Speakers from Discrimination
With this background in mind, it seems appropriate to re-
consider the outcome of the hypothetical job interview in the
Introduction. If we abandon the common sense view of lan-
guage and accept linguists' scientific explanation of Black
English, it becomes much less obvious that an applicant who
says "aks," "we be writing," and "I never had no problems"
should be denied employment or promotion. The question is,
should this applicant have a cause of action against the em-
ployer if she is rejected because of her speech? In other words,
does Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of...
race" include an employment decision based on an individual's
use of Black English?"s°
177. Thomas, supra note 20, at 1A.
178. BAUGH, supra note 70, at 134.
179. See John Baugh, Hypocorrection: Mistakes in Production of Vernacular Afri-
can American English as a Second Dialect, 12 LANGUAGE AND COMM. 317 (1992).
180. Title VII states that employers cannot "refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. . ." 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(aXl) (1994).
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Given the significant disadvantages faced by Black Eng-
lish speakers in the workplace,"' one might expect this
question to have been raised and answered long ago. But in
fact no court has directly addressed the question. Ironically,
it seems that the pervasiveness of the common sense view
of Black English not only leads to extensive discrimination
against Black English speakers-it also prevents possible
plaintiffs from attempting to bring a claim, or even from
realizing that they might have one."8 2
This is not to say that no plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination case has ever presented evidence to show that
his or her use of Black English contributed to the defen-
dant's adverse action. In Sparks v. Griffin," for example,
the defendant stated that one of the reasons for the plain-
tiff's dismissal from her teaching job was that "[she] has a
language problem. She cannot help the negro dialect, but it
is certainly bad for the children to be subjected to it all
day."'" Similarly, in Edwards v. Gladewater Independent
School District,'8 the plaintiff's teaching contract was not
renewed, allegedly because of complaints received from par-
ents and students, some of which concerned the plaintiff's
"black accent."'
However, it is unclear from the opinions in these cases
whether the plaintiffs meant to argue that the defendants'
negative reactions to Black English, taken alone, consti-
tuted race discrimination. In Sparks, the court found other
evidence sufficient to prove race discrimination; its only
181. See supra Part I.A (describing disadvantages).
182. The fact that no test case has yet been brought, although both Title VII and
linguistic research on the nature of Black English have existed for more than 30
years, is a testament to the hegemonic power of Standard Language Ideology. See
infra Part IV. It exemplifies the third type of power discussed by Steven Lukes-the
power to determine when a conflict or claim even exists:
[Ius it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people,
to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cogni-
tions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing
order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or
because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as di-
vinely ordained and beneficial?
STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 24 (1974) (cited in Angela P. Harris, Fore-
word: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 746 n.25 (1994)).
183. 460 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1972).
184. Id. at 436 n.1.
185. 572 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1978).
186. Id. at 498.
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comment on the language issue was limited to a footnote
questioning the administrator's ability to diagnose a lan-
guage problem, given the numerous errors in his written
statements."7 Similarly, the court in Edwards merely re-
peated the trial court's finding that the plaintiff could be
easily understood and found that other evidence was suffi-
cient to prove race discrimination.'" Thus, in each of these
cases (and no doubt others like them) the court was able to
avoid addressing the "concededly delicate" question of
whether discrimination against Black English speakers
constitutes race discrimination. 8 9
1. Disparate Treatment Framework-A plaintiff wishing
to pursue this question under the disparate treatment
framework"9 might take as a model a recent Title VII action
concerning the Hawaiian Creole dialect. The plaintiff in
Kahakua v. Friday9' was an experienced meteorologist who
applied for a promotion to a radio broadcaster position. 92
The position entailed reading weather reports from pre-
pared scripts which were written in Standard English. 93
Because Mr. Kahakua speaks a variety of Hawaiian Creole
which linguists term "Acrolectal Hawaiian Creole English"
or "Standard Hawaiian English," evaluators from the
Weather Service found his speech unacceptable for weather
broadcasts; they gave the position to another applicant with
far less experience who spoke Standard English.'9 ' Mr. Ka-
hakua brought a disparate treatment suit against the
Weather Service-and lost. The judge accepted the Weather
Service's argument that the other candidate had "better
pronunciation" and "better understandability," and thus
found that race was not a factor in the decision. 9 '
187. See Sparks, 460 F.2d at 442 n.2.
188. See Edwards, 572 F.2d at 498.
189. See Rosina Lippi-Green, Accent, Standard Language Ideology, and Discrimi-
natory Pretext in the Courts, 23 LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY 163, 178-80 (1994) (discussing
Sparks and Edwards).
190. For a discussion of the disparate impact framework, see Part II.C.2 infra; for
a discussion of a reasonable accommodation approach to discrimination against
speakers of Black English, see Part II.C.3 infra.
191. 876 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989), aftg sub nom. Kahakua v. Hallgren, No. 86-0434
(D. Haw. 1987). The facts of this unpublished decision have been taken from Matsuda,
supra note 2, at 1340-46.
192. See generally Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1344-46.
193. See id. at 1341.
194. See id. at 1341-45.
195. See id. at 1345.
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Of course, since the plaintiff in Kahakua was unsuccess-
ful, Kahakua would appear to be a model for a future Black
English discrimination suit only in so far as it involved a
dialect that resembles Black English in many ways: Like
Black English, Standard Hawaiian English originally devel-
oped as a creole; like Black English, it is intelligible to
Standard English speakers-in fact, it has undergone even
more decreolization and now differs from Standard English
only in its pronunciation rules; and like Black English, it is
a stigmatized variety spoken by non-whites (Asians and na-
tive Hawaiians).'
But Kahakua also demonstrates where the point of
controversy would lie in a Black English disparate treat-
ment suit. The debate should not center on the plaintiff's
prima facie contention that she was qualified for the job;
rather, the factfinder would need to decide whether the
defendant's rejection of the plaintiff's speech was in reality
a pretext for race discrimination. 9 7 The defendant could
meet its burden of production on this issue by articulating,
as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, its
claim that the plaintiff spoke incorrectly.'98 The plaintiff
196. See id. at 1342-44.
197. On the respective burdens of production and persuasion in a disparate
treatment case, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 US. 792, 802-05 (1973)
and Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
The plaintiff's prima facie case is made by showing: (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802 (footnote omitted).
Here, "qualified" means only a threshold ability to do the job; it does not involve a
comparative analysis of applicants. See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d
1277, 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). In general, courts have held that any subjective criteria
forming part of the applicant's qualifications, which would normally be part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, are more properly considered at the pretext stage, because
the "evaluation that a plaintiff lacks these qualities [is] more susceptible of abuse
and more likely to mask pretext.' Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1989).
Once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenged action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. The plaintiff then
has an opportunity to show that the defendant's proffered reason is merely a pretext
for discrimination. Id. at 802-05. The burden of persuasion on the issue of pretext
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
198. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. A plaintiff could argue, of course,
that the requirement that employees speak the Standard English dialect rather than
the Black English dialect is neither legitimate nor nondiscriminatory and thus that
an employer who offered this reason failed to meet its burden of production. As the
Burdine Court made clear, however, the defendant does not have "the burden of per-
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would then need to persuade the factfinder that this reason
was pretextual.'9
Despite the outcome of Kahakua, it is conceivable that a
plaintiff in a Black English case would be able to persuade the
factfmder of this. If the trier of fact accepts the linguists' view
of Black English, it should find that Black English is neither
grammatically incorrect nor unintelligible to Standard English
speakers, and thus that the defendant's proferred reason is not
credible.2" However, this finding alone would not lead inexora-
bly to the plaintiff's victory. Under St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,"°1 the ultimate issue of discrimination in a disparate
treatment suit remains open even after the plaintiff has rebut-
ted the defendant's proffered explanation for its action."2 The
final outcome depends on the factfinder's willingness to infer
pretext from the defendant's inability to provide a convincing,
nondiscriminatory explanation.
It is at this point exactly that Title VII law becomes most
controversial, or more colloquially, murky.20 3 The disparate
treatment framework was originally designed to apply to cases
of intentional discrimination: those in which defendants were
consciously motivated by discriminatory animus against
blacks or members of another protected class.'" As many
suading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257
(emphasis added). Rather, the defendant must merely provide "reasons for its actions
which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimi-
nation was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 &
n.8).
199. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05 (stating that an employer may
not use an employee's illegal conduct as a pretext for discrimination); Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256 (stating that a plaintiff must show that the offered reason is not the true
reason for an employment decision).
200. See supra Part II.B (explaining the linguists' view of Black English). The ar-
gument that Black English is neither ungrammatical nor unintelligible is further
discussed below as part of the analysis of "business necessity" under the disparate
impact framework. See infra notes 254-82 and accompanying text.
201. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
202. See id. at 510-11 (stating that rejection of defendant's proffered reason per-
mits, rather than compels, the trier of fact to infer discrimination).
203. Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks triology has resulted in such
unpredictable-and undesirable-outcomes at the lower court level that at least one
commentator has recommended eliminating the framework altogether. See Deborah
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2236 (1995).
204. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516-17 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256); see also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Dis-
crimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168-77
(1995) (explaining that, in the context of race discrimination but not age discrimina-
tion, most courts have equated disparate treatment with intentional discrimination).
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critics have argued, however, this type of discrimination no
longer represents-if indeed it ever did-the most common or
problematic type of discrimination."05 More often, disfavorable
treatment of women or minorities stems from employers'
unconscious instincts2° or cognitive biases."° Because the
resulting discrimination is no less pernicious for its victims,
courts have often been willing to apply a notion of "construc-
tive intent"20 8 (or, as one of my first-year law professors would
have put it, "fake" intent). Without explicitly changing the
rationale of the disparate treatment framework, some courts
appear to have refocused the central inquiry from one of intent
to one of negligence."
Nevertheless, prospects for the plaintiff in a Black English
disparate treatment suit are less than bright. Although under
some interpretations of disparate treatment law defendants
may be found liable when they have only been negligent, most
judges and juries still see the central question in a disparate
treatment suit to be whether the defendant is "a racist and a
liar."210 This characterization simply doesn't fit the facts in Ka-
hakua or in a future Black English discrimination case. Due to
their subconscious rejection of the communicative burden, the
evaluators in Kahakua actually did perceive Mr. Kahakua to
be less intelligible than the applicant who spoke Standard
English.2 " A factfinder searching for a liar will not find one in
205. Numerous authors have criticized the emphasis on intent or conscious dis-
criminatory motive in the disparate treatment framework. See, e.g., Krieger, supra
note 204 (discussing the fact that Title VII jurisprudence rejects evidence of noncon-
scious, unintentional bias in disparate treatment cases); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that equal protection doctrine should also respond to the
problem of unconscious racism).
206. See Lawrence, supra note 205 (drawing on psychoanalytic theory to argue
that much disparate treatment results from subconscious instincts and motivations).
207. See Krieger, supra note 204 (drawing on research in cognitive psychology to
argue that most disparate treatment stems from cognitive biases). Because of cogni-
tive bias, "lain employee's group status may [affect] the decisionmaker in completely
nonconscious ways by affecting what he saw, how he interpreted it, the causes to
which he attributed it, what he remembered, and what he forgot." Id. at 1170.
208. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 924 (1993) (discussing courts' willingness to find constructive intent).
209. See id. at 917-67.
210. Krieger, supra note 204, at 1163.
211. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (explaining that intelligibility
is subjective and depends in part on listener's assumption of part of the communica-
tive burden); see also Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1345, 1362 & n.124, 1386-87
(discussing role of intelligibility in Kahakua).
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an employer who honestly believes that an objective intelligi-
bility problem exists.212
In an influential article, Professor Mari Matsuda has pro-
posed a creative solution to this dilemma. She suggests that
courts adopt an altered framework for accent discrimination
which combines aspects of disparate treatment analysis with
aspects of disparate impact analysis.213 In her proposed
framework, the plaintiff's prima facie case would be the same
as that under disparate treatment analysis, but the defen-
dant's burden would more closely resemble that in a disparate
impact case. Defendant employers would need to show, in es-
sence, that their decision reflected business necessity, because
after a fair evaluation, they found that the plaintiff could not
communicate with relevant, nonprejudiced listeners at the
level required for the job.214
Plaintiffs like Mr. Kahakua or the plaintiff in our hypotheti-
cal Black English case actually have another option open to
them within the disparate treatment framework itself. Unlike
accent discrimination plaintiffs with an "L2" accent (whose
speech contains errors caused by interference from their first
language), speakers of Standard Hawaiian English or Black
English do not actually commit errors when they speak; they
are speaking their first language-a dialect of English-
correctly. 5 They have an accent-an "LI" accent--only in so
far as speakers of every variety of English, including Standard
English, have a particular accent.
16
Thus, the plaintiff in an Li accent discrimination case
brought under the disparate treatment framework could ask
the factfinder to focus on a conscious aspect of the employer's
212. In other words, "if the plaintiff must prove a deliberate scheme to use accent
as a cover for discrimination, plaintiffs in accent cases will always lose." Matsuda,
supra note 2, at 1383.
213. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1383.
214. See id. at 1383-84. Professor Matsuda also argues that employers should
have to produce some evidence to show that a reasonable accommodation could not
alleviate the plaintiff's inability to communicate at the level required for the job. See
id. This aspect of her proposed framework goes beyond existing Title VII law. See id.
at 1368. Borrowed from disability law, it is meant to eliminate the potential anomaly
of treating physical speech impediments more favorably than accents. See id. at 1368,
1379-82 (explaining rationale for reasonable accommodation requirement).
215. This holds true for Mr. Kahakua even though he was reading a text written
in Standard (Written) English, since Standard Hawaiian English differs from Stan-
dard English only at the level of pronunciation. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1344 &
n.56 (explaining differences between Basilectal Hawaiian Creole and Acrolectal Ha-
waiian Creole (or Standard Hawaiian English)).
216. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing difference between Li
and L2 accents).
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negative reaction: the assumption that her speech is incorrect
or ungrammatical. The conscious, linguistically inaccurate be-
lief that some dialects of English are less grammatical than
others could be analogized to a conscious belief (once also
widely held) that women are less intelligent than men. Seen in
this light, discrimination against stigmatized Li accents ap-
pears to be a form of intentional discrimination, amenable to
analysis under the disparate treatment framework.
217
But once again, the results in Kahakua suggest caution. As
Professor Matsuda notes, the judge in Kahakua "discounted
the testimony of the linguist who stated that Hawaiian Creole
pronunciation is not incorrect, [but rather] one of the many
varieties of pronunciation of standard English."218 According to
the judge, "[tihe linguist.., was not an expert in speech."219
It may be that the judge in Kahakua was unwilling to di-
rectly confront the question of Li accent discrimination under
the disparate treatment framework because of the continuing
influence of that framework's original rationale: identifying
employers who lie about their true racist motivations. The
judge's reluctance was understandable, because holding con-
scious, false beliefs about language-the result of a lifetime
steeped in Standard Language Ideology220 -does not make one
a liar. As one scholar explains, "[ideology] is not (quite) the
same as lying. .. 'whereas the liar tries to falsify the thought
of others while his own private thought is correct ... a person
who falls for an ideology is himself deluded in his private
thought, and if he misleads others, does so unwillingly and
unwittingly.' ' 21' Thus, as long as the disparate treatment
framework is applied to search for "racists and liars," it is un-
likely to be an effective means of combatting Standard
Language Ideology and the subordination of Black English
speakers.
2. Disparate Impact Framework-Fortunately, yet another
option remains open to these speakers (and speakers of any
other fully intelligible but stigmatized dialect of English which
217. Professor Matsuda does not emphasize this possibility because she treats Li
accents and L2 accents identically, focusing on the problem of intelligibility which is
common to both. See Matsuda, supra note 2.
218. Id. at 1345-46.
219. Id. at 1346.
220. See generally LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2 (explaining how American institu-
tions, including the education system, the media, and the entertainment industry,
introduce and reinforce Standard Language Ideology).
221. CLIFFORD GEERT%, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 196 (1973) (quoting W.
STARK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 48 (1958)).
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is largely confined to a nonwhite community).' Rather than
asking courts to adopt Professor Matsuda's alternative accent
discrimination framework, they could avoid the need to prove
discriminatory intent by pursuing a claim under the existing
disparate impact framework.'
Professor Matsuda rejects this possibility because, as she
sees it, "[iimpact cases typically involve large numbers of po-
tential plaintiffs and statistical evidence to show systematic
employment discrimination[,I [while] [1]inguistic discrimina-
tion by definition focuses on the odd accent, the isolated
difference in speech that stands out and is called 'an ac-
cent."'22 Here the labels "isolated" and "odd" must refer to an
employer perspective tainted by Standard Language Ideology,
since, in purely numerical terms, disfavored accents may actu-
ally dominate a community.2"' Doctrinally speaking, however,
this characterization of the misfit between disparate impact
analysis and accent discrimination is accurate, at least with
respect to L2 accents. Plaintiffs in L2 accent discrimination
cases must claim protection because of their national origin."
But because the term "national origin" in Title VII has been
defined to refer to an individual's ancestry as well as his or her
place of birth, it is difficult to show that an employer's anti-
accent stance has a disproportionate impact on a particular
222. Although this Article focuses on Black English, its analysis could be broad-
ened to include other nonstandard dialects of English as long as these dialects are
equally intelligible to Standard English speakers and as long as they are spoken by a
racially cohesive group. Standard Hawaiian English, discussed supra notes 192-96
and accompanying text, provides one example. "Chicano English" or "Spanglish" might
also qualify, but it is hard to be certain because these varieties have not yet received
as much attention from linguists as Black English. But see generally FORM AND
FUNCTION IN CHICANO ENGLISH (Jacob Ornstein-Galicia ed., 1988) (discussing linguis-
tic and sociocultural dimensions of Chicano English).
223. Title VIIs disparate impact framework was originally developed by the
courts, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), but has since been given a
statutory basis, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V
1993). One critical difference between the disparate treatment framework and the
disparate impact framework is that the latter does not require the plaintiff to prove
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. See Griggs, 401 US. at 430-32
(employment practices that disproportionately exclude blacks and are unrelated to job
performance struck down despite lack of discriminatory intent); see also International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334 n.15 (1977) (absence of intent
distinguishes disparate impact from disparate treatment).
224. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1382-83.
225. Spanish accents in certain parts of Florida could provide one example. See
Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (describing Florida
employer's treatment of Spanish-accented employee).
226. See 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (forbidding discrimination because of na-
tional origin).
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national origin class; too many individuals belonging to the
class will not share the plaintiff's L2 accent. =7
Crucially, however, this doctrinal problem does not arise for
speakers with racially linked Li accents, such as Standard
Hawaiian English or Black English. As I hope to demonstrate,
Black English speaking plaintiffs should have no trouble
making out a prima facie case in a Title VII disparate impact
suit.
A clarification regarding the difference between Li and L2
accents may be necessary at this point: I am not arguing that
discrimination against speakers with L2 accents should be ac-
ceptable merely because it is linguistically accurate to say that
L2-accented speech contains errors. Rather, the difference be-
tween L2 and Li accents means that current Title VII doctrine
applies differently to L2 accent discrimination and Li accent
discrimination. The law as currently interpreted does not pro-
vide adequate protection for speakers with L2 (or "foreign")
accents; they require a doctrinal modification along the lines
suggested by Professor Matsuda.22 In contrast, the law as it is
currently interpreted does protect Black English speakers
from discrimination-as long as the factfinder is willing to ac-
cept linguistic facts in place of ideologically driven "common
sense."
The plaintiff's prima facie case in a Title VII disparate im-
pact case requires a showing that a facially neutral
employment practice has a disproportionately adverse impact
on a protected class.29 Once the plaintiff reaches that thresh-
227. Professor Matsuda's accent discrimination framework represents one solu-
tion to this problem. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1367-87. Stephen Cutler has
suggested another solution: where employers discriminate against an ethnic trait
such as accent, courts could use as the comparison group for disparate impact analysis
the subclass of "less assimilated" members of a national origin class. See Stephen M.
Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VI, 94 YALE
L.J. 1164, 1172-73 (1985). Professor Juan Perea argues for a third solution to what he
terms the "correlation problem" between national origin and ethnic traits: an amend-
ment to Title VII specifically forbidding discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity.
See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin Discrimi-
nation Under Title VI, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 810 (1994). Under this approach,
the national origin category would no longer be read to include an individual's ances-
try; thus, victims of ethnic discrimination would no longer have to plead a "different"
national origin than that of the "normal" Americans in the comparison class (who in
reality also have "non-American" ancestry). See id. at 853-57.
228. For other possible approaches to the problem of L2 accent discrimination, see
supra note 227.
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993) (codifying the Civil Rights
Act of 1991's disparate impact framework); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971).
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old, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related and
justifiable as a matter of business necessity.2"
Thus, the plaintiff's initial burden in a Black English dispa-
rate impact suit could be divided into three components: (1)
identifying a specific employer practice; (2) showing a dispro-
portionate impact of this practice on a protected class; and (3)
demonstrating that this impact is truly "adverse."
The first hurdle is often the hardest for potential disparate
impact plaintiffs, because it can be difficult to separate one
specific employment practice from the employer's general
mode of operation."' But the plaintiff in a Black English dis-
parate impact suit could easily identify a specific employer
practice: the requirement that employees speak the Standard
English dialect. Seen through linguists' eyes, of course, such a
"Standard English Only" rule is anything but neutral: unlike
the typical employment requirement with disparate impact,
such as a requirement that employees have a high school di-
ploma,"2 requiring employees to speak the Standard English
dialect rather than the Black English dialect does reflect a
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Where the employer carries this burden,
the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that there exists an alternative practice that
would serve the employer's objectives equally well but have a less severe adverse ef-
fect. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
231. Linda Hamilton Krieger explains:
Because most individual employment decisions do not implicate identifiable
practices that can be shown to have a statistically significant disparate impact
on members of a protected group, very few Title VII cases are actually amena-
ble to disparate impact treatment. According to an American Bar Foundation
study, disparate impact cases comprised only 1.84% of all employment-related
civil rights cases in the federal court docket between 1985 and 1987.
Krieger, supra note 204, at 1163 n.3 (citing American Bar Foundation Employment
Discrimination Litigation Survey, Computer File (1990), cited in John J. Donahue III
& Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,
43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998 n.57 (1991)); see also Flagg, supra note 102, at 2027
(describing difficulty with identifying a specific practice where an employer's subjec-
tive selection procedure works against individuals with mutable ethnic traits). The
hypothetical plaintiff in Professor Flagg's article also experiences discrimination in
part because she speaks Black English. See id. at 2011 n.4. However, because Profes-
sor Flagg treats this as a mutable characteristic-her hypothetical plaintiff is fully
"bilingual," able to speak both Black English and Standard English-her analysis of
the application of the disparate impact framework to Black English speakers differs in
significant respects from mine.
232. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US. 424 (1971).
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specific prejudice against blacks, albeit an unconscious one.
But it is nonetheless in the plaintiff's interest to treat the re-
quirement as if it were neutral, since a direct attack on the
requirement's neutrality would have to take place under the
disparate treatment framework, which was shown above to be
an unattractive option.
The plaintiff's second hurdle-showing a disproportionate
impact of this practice on a protected class-should present no
insurmountable difficulties, given that such a large percentage
of the black community speaks Black English rather than
Standard English. As in other disparate impact cases, how-
ever, the exact measurement of the disproportionate impact
would involve some complexities. 234 Although linguists esti-
mate that the majority (80-90%) of blacks nationwide speak
Black English,23 the percentage of Black English speakers in a
particular community or applicant pool could vary from this
figure. In working class and poor communities the figure
might approach 100 percent, while in middle class communi-
ties the percentage would be much lower.2s The extent of the
disproportionate impact would then depend in part on the geo-
graphic boundaries of the applicant pool chosen for comparison,
since that would determine both the percentage of blacks able
to meet a Standard English requirement and the percentage of
non-blacks able to meet the requirement. 23' But even assuming
233. See supra Parts II.A-B (explaining that the status difference between Stan-
dard English and Black English reflects the relative status of each dialect's speakers
and not any intrinsic difference between the dialects themselves).
234. A short list of the issues that could arise at this stage of the litigation would
include "the choice of comparison groups--e.g., general population versus qualified
labor force-the geographic region and time frame within which the comparison is
made, the degree of disproportion between the compared groups, the accuracy of the
relevant data, and the statistical methods employed to assess the significance of iden-
tified disparities." Flagg, supra note 102, at 2021 (footnotes omitted); see also Elaine
Shoben, Defining the Relevant Population in Employment Discrimination Cases, in
STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 55 (D.H. Kaye & Mikel Aickin
eds., 1986) (discussing relevant factors).
235. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (noting linguists' finding that
Black English is more widespread in working class and poor communities); see also
LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 36-37 (discussing subtleties in distribution of Black
English dialect features).
237. The EEOC guidelines suggest that a "four-fifths rule" be applied to measure
disparate impact:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gen-
erally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse
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that this statistical hurdle would bar some individuals from
proving the obvious-that an employer's rejection of Black
English has a disparate impact on blacks-a significant num-
ber of potential plaintiffs should be able to surmount this
hurdle.238
It might seem that the final component of the plaintiff's
prima facie case-proving that this impact is truly "adverse7-
would be trivial: how could a "Standard English only" re-
quirement not have an adverse impact, if it means that
speaking Black English results in a loss of employment oppor-
tunities? But because some courts have concluded that
employer requirements cannot have an adverse impact where
they involve mutable characteristics, plaintiffs challenging
discrimination against Black English would have to produce
evidence showing that speaking Black English is essentially
immutable, rather than a matter of personal choice.
The "mutable conditions" exception was initially carved out
in Garcia v. Gloor,219 a Fifth Circuit case involving an "English
Only" rule. The employer in Gloor had forbidden his employees
to speak Spanish during work time unless they were assisting
a Spanish-speaking customer. ° An employee fired for violat-
ing the rule brought suit under Title VII, claiming both that
the rule had a disparate impact on bilingual Hispanic employ-
ees and that his firing qualified as disparate treatment.241 The
court rejected the disparate treatment argument on several
grounds, denying the link between language and national ori-
gin and finding that the employer was not using the rule as a
impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by
Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.
EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d)
(1997). In this context, this would mean that if 100% of the nonblacks in the applicant
pool spoke Standard English, the plaintiff would need to show that fewer than 80% of
the blacks in the comparison group spoke Standard English in order to prove dispa-
rate impact. If, on the other hand, only 75% of the comparison group spoke Standard
English (because some members spoke other stigmatized dialects of English or had L2
accents) then the plaintiff would need to show that fewer than 60% of the blacks in
the comparison group spoke Standard English in order to prove disparate impact. For
a discussion of other technical difficulties related to this second hurdle, see Flagg,
supra note 102, at 2025-27.
238. A successful suit would benefit more than just the individual plaintiffs in-
volved, since it would also serve to educate other employers and the public at large
about the true nature of Black English. See infra Part IV (discussing implications of
the radical solution).
239. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
240. Id. at 266.
241. Id. at 270.
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pretext to discriminate.242 The court further concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact because the rule did not represent a hardship for
bilingual employees (as bilinguals they could simply choose to
follow the rule) and because it did not create an atmosphere of
ethnic oppression.2 3 Under Gloor, there can be "no disparate
impact if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily
observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual prefer-
ence."' After Gloor was decided, the EEOC took a contrary
position, adopting guidelines which presume that "English
Only" rules have an adverse impact on those whose primary
language is not English.245 But the Ninth Circuit, in its most
recent decision on this issue, refused to defer to these guide-
lines, choosing instead to adopt the mutable characteristics
approach introduced by Gloor.2"
The mutable characteristics doctrine has been applied out-
side the language context as well. In Rogers v. American
Airlines, Inc.,247 for example, the court denied that a "No
Braided Hair" rule had an adverse impact on black women,
since they could choose to wear an alternative hairstyle. 8 The
court cited Gloor for the proposition that an employer does not
need to show the business necessity of a rule concerning mu-
table characteristics, even where those characteristics
implicate ethnic or racial identity. 9
This line of cases could be challenged on a number of differ-
ent grounds. 5 As an initial matter, one could question just
242. Id. at 268-69.
243. Id. at 270.
244. Id.
245. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997).
246. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). The court in Gar-
cia also rejected its own earlier decision on this issue. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct.,
838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 US. 1016 (1989).
247. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
248. Id. at 232.
249. Id.
250. For an analysis critical of the court's decision in Rogers, see Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 40 DUKE
L.J. 91. Many authors have also criticized the courts' approach to employer-imposed
"English Only" rules. See, e.g., Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and
Workplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REV. 849, 889-07 (1995) (critiquing the
analysis in several circuits); Martha Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural
Domination: A Rubin Trilogy on Title VII, 52 LA. L. REV. 1457, 1471-79 (1992)
(analyzing Garcia v. Gloor and subsequent cases); Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules
and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM. 265, 287-88 (1990) (challenging the basis of the Garcia decision); Jeffrey D.
Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73
TEX. L. REV. 871, 900-07, 911-16 (1995) (questioning the relevance of choice in Title
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how simple it is for employees--even those labeled "bilingual"--
to abide by an "English Only" rule;251 one could also question
whether such rules can really be imposed without creating an
atmosphere of ethnic tension and oppression.252 More funda-
mentally, one could question the courts' assumption that
employers have the right to demand assimilation to
white/Anglo norms regarding language or appearance; as the
Gloor court itself noted, Title VII does not permit employers to
demand assimilation in the context of religion, despite the fact
that religious traits are mutable.253
But plaintiffs who have experienced discrimination based on
their use of Black English would not need to challenge the mu-
table characteristics doctrine in order to show that a Standard
English requirement has an adverse effect because their
status as Black English speakers is essentially immutable. If
the factfinder accepts the linguistic understanding of Black
English presented in Part II.B, it should recognize that, unlike
the bilingual employees in Gloor, who could switch between
Spanish and (perhaps accented) English if necessary, most
Black English speakers cannot simply choose to speak Stan-
dard English any more than Standard English speakers can
choose to speak Black English.
Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the employer
to show that the practice in question is job related and consis-
tent with business necessity.25 Although Congress intended to
VII judgment). For discussions of the related controversy over the "Official English"
movement, see JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE
POLITICS OF "ENGLISH ONLY" (1992); LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE
OFFIcIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY (James Crawford ed., 1992); Juan F. Perea, Demog-
raphy and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and
Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 340-50 (1992); Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Com-
ment, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yniguez and the Racialization of
English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 227-29 (1997).
251. The phenomenon of "code-switching" between two languages is actually quite
complex and, to some degree, beyond conscious control. See supra notes 173-77 and
accompanying text (describing "code-switching"); see also Alfredo Mirande, "En la
Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto Es Rey" ("In the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is
King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L. REV. 75, 93-98 (1996) (describing
complexities of code-switching and implications for Title VII analysis of English Only
rules).
252. See Adams, supra note 250, at 901.
253. See 618 F.2d at 270 n.6.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US.
424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.").
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clarify these concepts in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the exact
nature of the employer's burden remains unclear: "The over-
arching issue continues to be whether the term 'necessity' in
the business necessity defense literally requires that the dis-
criminatory practice be essential to the continued viability of
the business, or whether it requires something less." 5 The
Supreme Court has provided definitions of varying strict-
ness; 256 at a minimum, however, the defendant must show that
the challenged practice has a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question"27 by showing that "goals [of safety
and efficiency] are significantly served by--even if they do not
require-[the defendant's] rule."258
This may be a much harder question than whether dis-
crimination against the Black English dialect has an adverse
effect upon blacks. Employers will argue that they should be
able to require employees to speak Standard English because
communication skills are critical to job performance. The em-
ployer must be right with respect to the latter part of this
argument: no one can deny that communication skills are im-
portant for many jobs. The debate must instead focus on the
first part of the argument: is speaking Standard English a
necessary component of good communication skills?
Common sense says "yes"--of course Standard English is a
necessary component of good communication skills. How could
an employee communicate effectively if he or she could not
speak proper, grammatical English?259 The plaintiff has two
main counter-arguments. The first concerns the dialect's intel-
ligibility: Black English is not difficult for Standard English
speakers to understand (or vice versa). The second concerns
the dialect's linguistic acceptability: Black English is not an
incorrect version of Standard English. If Black English is a
fully intelligible English dialect with the same linguistic
status as Standard English, there is no reason to consider the
rejection of Black English a business necessity.
The plaintiff's intelligibility argument depends on the lin-
guistic evidence presented in Part II.B. Black English is not
255. Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 387 (1996); see also Flagg, supra note 102, at
2021-22 (explaining why nature of the employer's burden remains unclear even after
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
256. See Flagg, supra note 102, at 2022.
257. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (quoting
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424).
258. Id. at 587.
259. See supra Part L.A for further examples of the common sense view.
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difficult for Standard English speakers to understand because
the two dialects are very closely related-they share a number
of language rules and have nearly equivalent vocabularies.
Speakers of both dialects have asymmetrical competence: they
can only produce speech in one dialect but are able to under-
stand both.
The judge or the jury members should be able to grasp this
argument using personal experience, since they have probably
interacted with Black English speakers and had no trouble
understanding their speech. (Alternatively, if they are Black
English speakers, they should know that they have no trouble
understanding Standard English.) To the extent that factfinders
think otherwise, their experience may well be based on
unacknowledged prejudice-the subconscious rejection of their
portion of the communicative burden in response to the lower
status accorded to the Black English dialect. Given the
subjective nature of intelligibility judgments, the factfinder
should apply a protocol like the one suggested by Professor
Matsuda for the evaluation of accents in order to fairly
evaluate the intelligibility of the plaintiff's speech for the
relevant pool of nonprejudiced listeners.60 If such a protocol
is adopted, factfinders should hold that Black English does
not present a communication problem in the workplace for
lack of intelligibility.
26 1
The plaintiffs second counter-argument to the employer's
claim of business necessity, the acceptability argument, also
depends on the linguistic evidence presented in Part II.B. Ac-
cording to linguists, there is nothing intrinsic to Standard
English that makes it more correct, grammatical, or proper
than Black English. The label "Standard" is just that-a label.
Standard English acquired that label for social and political
reasons, not linguistic ones.
Although the explanation of Black English presented above
is not controversial among linguists-they emphasize that it
260. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1368-82.
261. Under Professor Matsuda's suggested protocol, the full communicative bur-
den might be placed on the speaker in certain rare situations, where (i) the
consequences of miscommunication are grave; (ii) the job is substantially oral in na-
ture; (iii) the setting is stressful and time is of the essence; and (iv) the interaction is
contextless and typically restricted to one-time exchanges. See Matsuda, supra note 2,
at 1369. Professor Matsuda gives as an example the job of a 911 operator. Id. Even
here, however, the employee's language abilities would have to be evaluated in con-
text: if the typical 911 caller in a certain area speaks Black English, an operator who
speaks Black English might actually communicate more effectively than one who
speaks Standard English.
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is scientific fact, not political correctness 262 or "left-wing
propaganda "20-it may prove quite controversial in the
courtroom. Thus, regardless of the weight of the evidence
showing that Black English is not bad grammar, one might
wonder whether the jury or the judge could be convinced-
even where expert testimony is provided by linguists."6 Since
this is an empirical question, not a legal question, the answer
can only be speculative.
Certainly the court's conclusion in Kahakua, which dis-
counted the linguist's testimony that Standard Hawaiian
English is not an incorrect version of Standard English be-
cause the linguist "was not an expert in speech,"21 is less than
encouraging. Other courts, in the few published cases involv-
ing Black English, have shown a similar reluctance to apply
linguistic fact to resolve legal issues. Tyler v. Vickery, 2" a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Georgia bar exam,
provides one example. The court in Tyler gave a reasoned
analysis for its rejection of the plaintiffs' first argument-that
the examiners were intentionally discriminating against blacks,
-using Black English "cues" from the written exams in order to
recognize black examinees. 27 By contrast, the court limited to
a single footnote its comments on the plaintiffs' second argu-
ment regarding the validity of the Black English dialect:
Appellants also contend that Black English may result
in overt discrimination even if the examiner does not
recognize its use as a racial characteristic but merely
reacts negatively because he conceives it to be incorrect.
As this claim is equally susceptible to all of the other
reasons we cite for concluding that no material issue of
262. See Pasternak, supra note 127.
263. See Pullum, supra note 5, at 322 ("[L]inguists' objective attitude toward non-
standard dialects [is often dismissed by nonlinguists] as if it were just left-wing
propaganda. But it is not. Even conservative linguists acknowledge the facts men-
tioned above (concerning Black English's status as a dialect]. When the Linguistic
Society of America voted in January on a resolution in support of the Oakland school
board, the vote was unanimous.').
264. Expert testimony would be appropriate in a Title VII case concerning Black
English because of the disparity between common sense (a layperson's view of Black
English) and linguistic theory. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 33 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
265. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1345-46.
266. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975).
267. See id. at 1093-95.
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fact exists on this claim, we need not address ourselves to
its intrinsic merits.2
In fact, it is not at all clear from the opinion why this argu-
ment presents "no material issue of fact." The court might
have accepted the linguistic evidence concerning Black English
and still not found that negative assessments of exams show-
ing Black English features constitutes discrimination, since
written language and spoken language are, linguistically
speaking, two quite different things.6 9 But one senses from the
opinion that the court simply wished to dispose of the argu-
ment with as little analysis as possible in order to avoid
explicitly confronting the Standard Language Ideology which
underlies the common sense rejection of Black English as poor
grammar.
In a different context, another court did demonstrate a
greater willingness to accept linguistic evidence regarding the
nature of Black English. In Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary
School Children v. Ann Arbor School District Board,270 the
court held that the defendant school district had violated a
federal law guaranteeing equal educational opportunity by
failing to recognize the special difficulties that face Black
English speaking students who are learning to read and write
Standard Written English. In order to reach this conclusion,
the court had to accept linguists' testimony that Black English
is "a distinct, definable version of English, different from stan-
dard English .... [with its own] definite language patterns,
syntax, grammar and history."27' The court required the school
district to educate its teachers about the true nature of Black
English so that they could effectively teach Standard Written
English skills to Black English speaking students.272
However, the court's willingness to accept linguistic fact only
went so far. In a feat of cognitive dissonance, the court man-
aged to accept the scientific fact that Black English is not "an
inferior method of speech,"27 while simultaneously accepting,
without question, the social fact that Black English is "not an
acceptable method of communication in the educational world,
268. Id. at 1094 n.3.
269. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing the difference be-
tween written and spoken language).
270. 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
271. Id. at 1378.
272. See id. at 1383.
273. See id. at 1377.
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in the commercial community, in the community of the arts
and science, or among professionals."27'
The opinions in Tyler and Martin Luther King Jr. Elemen-
tary School Children demonstrate that courts will go to some
length to avoid a direct challenge to the common sense view of
Black English. But the issue of Black English's acceptability as
a dialect would stand in the very center of a Title VII dispa-
rate impact suit. Forced to consider the issue thoroughly and
explicitly, the factfinder in a Title VII suit should conclude
that Black English is not simply an inferior version of Stan-
dard English. Certainly, if evidence and reason play a greater
role in the decision than unexamined, ideologically driven
"common sense," the plaintiff should succeed on this issue.
A defendant employer might argue that a Standard English
requirement nonetheless constitutes a business necessity, be-
cause the average person who comes into contact with its
employees will not be aware of "obscure" linguistic research
concerning nonstandard dialects:
Some jobs ... require incumbents who can promote an or-
ganization's cultivated public image. This can be a bona
fide requirement for many receptionists, customer service
representatives, and certain sales associates. In such
cases, a personnel test might legitimately impose more
rigorous [spoken language] requirements . ... 275
But here the court should find just the opposite. It is true that
Title VII permits employers "to hire and employ... on the ba-
sis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise
.. . .276 But Congress chose not to allow this BFOQ defense in
race discrimination suits.
2 77
274. See id. at 1378.
275. Don Rubin, Cultural Bias Undermines Assessment, PERSONNEL J., May, 1992,
at 47, 52.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
277. See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1980)
(refusing to extend Title VII's BFOQ defense to race discrimination cases). A very
narrow judge-made exception does allow employers to select employees based on race
in those few instances where it is truly necessary (e.g., for an acting job). See, e.g.,
Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing
extent of judge-made exception); Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service Comm'n, 649
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1981) (same).
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Furthermore, employers pleading a BFOQ defense may not
rely on customer or client preferences. As one court explained,
in an opinion rejecting an airline's claim that customer prefer-
ence required them to hire only female flight attendants: "[It
would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences
and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was ... these very preju-
dices the Act was meant to overcome."2 1' Thus, "it is [also]
clearly forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to
hire someone because your customers or clientele do not like
his race."279
An employer might argue in response that the case law re-
jecting the customer preference defense is simply not
applicable in a disparate impact suit where customer prefer-
ences appear to involve language characteristics, not race. One
could understand Gloor and Rogers to support this argument,
since courts in those cases permitted employers to cater to the
(perceived) desires of customers not to see braided hair or hear
Spanish spoken in the workplace, although these characteris-
tics also implicate racial or ethnic identity.2 s° But, crucially, the
courts in these cases were not considering whether a "No
Braids" or an "English Only" rule constituted a business neces-
sity; rather, they were deciding whether such rules had an
adverse impact on protected classes. The imposition of the mu-
table characteristics doctrine at the prima facie case stage of
litigation should mean that the job related/business necessity
defense is strictly interpreted.28 ' Under this doctrine, employers
278. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting
employer's BFOQ argument based on purported customer preference for female flight
attendants because of their "soothing" qualities); see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,
653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting BFOQ argument that a female can-
not be an oil company executive because customers from other cultures would refuse
to do business with a woman).
279. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1983).
280. See supra notes 239-53 and accompanying text (discussing Gloor and
Rogers).
281. See supra notes 239-53 and accompanying text. This may be a hidden advan-
tage of the mutable characteristics doctrine which critics of Gloor and Rogers have
missed: if the question of adversity is determined purely from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, as some have suggested, see Kirtner, supra note 250, then courts would have to
interpret the job related/business necessity defense to permit a customer preference
argument in some cases. The line that critics would like to draw between permissible
job requirements (say, that employees not smoke on the job) and impermissible ones
(such as those in Rogers and Gloor) which implicate racial, sexual, or ethnic identity
may actually prove easier to draw in the context of the adversity question. In other
words, arguing that the rules in cases such as Gloor and Rogers do in fact have an
adverse impact (based on ethnic and racial considerations) may prove more effective
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need only defend job requirements in those instances where
the members of a protected class cannot simply choose to meet
the requirement. Because speaking Black English is basically
an immutable trait (given that adult speakers of one dialect
cannot easily learn to speak another dialect fluently), employ-
ers should not be permitted to reject Black English speakers
based on customer preference. To allow a customer preference
argument at this stage of disparate impact litigation would in
essence permit customers or clients to choose employees'
race--exactly what Title VII was intended to prevent . 2
Employers might protest, finally, that a finding for the
plaintiff would leave them with no ability to screen out appli-
cants whose speech is careless or contains mistakes or errors.
But the court should also reject this argument, because it re-
flects a continuing confusion about the nature of spoken
language. Just as no dialect is more grammatical than other
dialects, no dialect permits its speakers to make more speech
errors. To the extent that sentence fragments, slips of the
tongue, and so on, occur, they are a product of our general
speech capacity and occur equally frequently in every dialect.
Employers should certainly be allowed to prefer employees
who speak eloquently or effectively-but they should not be
permitted to assume that only Standard English speech can be
eloquent or effective.
Given these arguments, the applicant in the Introduction
might be well-advised to take the employer to court if she is
rejected because she speaks Black English. Although her claim
might be a case of first impression, the law and evidence are
on her side. Title VII should prevent employers from discrimi-
nating against speakers of Black English, because this practice
has an adverse impact upon a protected class, and no business
necessity justifies it.
3. Reasonable Accommodation of Differences in Reading
and Writing Skills-A variant of this radical solution would
extend protection even further to cover speakers of Black Eng-
lish where written language skills are critical to job
performance. As explained above, written language, unlike
spoken language, is a cultural artifact; it does not arise di-
than assuming an adverse impact and arguing that the rules do not constitute a busi-
ness necessity.
282. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1376-79 (arguing against customer preference
defense in accent discrimination cases).
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rectly from the brain's language machine.2" Standard written
forms tend to be based on those dialects whose speakers enjoy
the greatest political and economic power. In the United
States, this means that Standard Written English most closely
resembles the Standard English dialect. Because Black Eng-
lish speakers have historically lacked political and economic
power, Black English remains a "vernacular": it lacks a stan-
dard written form.2s' Thus, it is not possible to argue that
employers must allow Black English speakers to write Black
English as well as speak it, because there is no such written
form for Black English speakers to use.
Nonetheless, it seems unjust to insist that Black English
speakers demonstrate exactly the same skill level in Standard
Written English as individuals who are fortunate enough to
speak the dialect upon which Standard Written English (for
purely political and social reasons) is based. Standard English
speakers are able to learn Standard Written English more
easily than speakers of Black English, both because Standard
Written English is based on their dialect and because teachers
create additional barriers for black students by treating Black
English as bad grammar.2 5 Ignoring these facts could mean
perpetuating current societal inequalities indefinitely.
283. See supra Part II.B.1.
284. Authors who use Black English dialog are essentially creating their own form
of written Black English. See Sonya Live: Black English, supra note 12 (discussing the
Black English dialog in Alice Walker's book 7e Color Purple); see also supra note 5
(explaining term "vernacular").
285. See Pullum, supra note 5, at 322 (summarizing empirical evidence, including
Oakland study which found that "teachers who condemned [Black English]
pronunciations and interpreted them as reading errors got the worst results in
teaching black children to read, while teachers who used [Black English] creatively in
class got the best results"); see also Role of "Ebonics" in Education: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Serv. & Educ. of the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, Jan. 23, 1997 (testimony of Stanford linguistics professor John
Rickford, summarizing research); TORE OSTERBERG, BILINGUALISM AND THE FIRST
SCHOOL LANGUAGE (1961) (describing experiments with nonstandard Swedish dialect
speakers); TAYLOR, supra note 62 (contrasting the success of the scientific approach,
which compares features of Black English and Standard English, with failure of
traditional remedial language teaching techniques); Tove Bull, Teaching School
Beginners to Read and Write in the Vernacular, in TROMS LINGUISTICS IN THE
EIGHTIES (1990) (describing successful results of program for nonstandard Norwegian
dialect speakers); Ann McCormick Piestrup, Black Dialect Interference and
Accommodation of Reading Instruction in First Grade, in 4 MONOGRAPHS OF THE
LANG. BEHAVIOR RES. LAB. (1973) (comparing results of scientific and "common sense"
approaches); John R. Rickford, Unequal Partnership: Sociolinguistics and the African
American Speech Community, 26 LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY 161 (1997) [hereinafter
Rickford, Unequal Partnership] (describing implications of research on Black English
for elementary education); Gary Simpkins & Charlesetta Simpkins, Cross-Cultural
Approach to Curriculum Development, in BLACK ENGLISH AND THE EDUCATION OF
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The best solution may be for courts to apply a reasonable
accommodation framework:"" employers would then have to
make any costless or low cost accommodations that would
permit a Black English speaker to take a position in which
written language skills were critical to job performance.2 7 Pos-
sible accommodations could include providing a word processor
with spelling and grammar check programs or providing extra
secretarial assistance.
In the context of disability or religious differences, reasonable
accommodation law helps avoid arbitrary exclusion. It steps in
where the majority's contingent choices about "normal" employ-
ees would otherwise prevent individuals from participating
BLACK CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Geneva Smithermann ed., 1981) (describing successful
use of vernacular "bridge" readers and comparing failure of traditional remedial
reading techniques); Doug Cumming, A Different Approach to Teaching Language,
ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 9, 1997, at B1 (describing successful "Bidialectal
Communication" program in DeKalb County, Georgia, which emphasizes learning to
.code switch" between Black English and Standard English); John R. Rickford,
Ebonics Succeeds Where Traditional Methods Do Not, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec.
26, 1996, at 8B (describing results of various studies).
286. Courts might interpret Title VII as it is currently written to include such an
obligation, just as courts once interpreted the statute to include an obligation to ac-
commodate religious differences. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709,
714 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (following EEOC guidelines in imposing reasonable accommo-
dation requirement in religious discrimination case), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 402 US. 689 (1971). Congress might then respond by codifying
the obligation, just as it did in the context of religious discrimination. See 42 US.C.
§ 2000e(j) (1988) (stating that employers have an obligation to accommodate reason-
able religious observances and practices).
A statutory amendment would allow Congress to divide the financial burden of ac-
commodation between employers and society at large: employers could bear that
portion of the cost which reflects their long term investment, while the government
could bear any additional "reasonable" costs. See generally Sue A. Krenek, Note, Be-
yond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969 (1994) (arguing that the
Americans with Disabilities Act should be amended to provide for such public-private
partnerships). This approach would avoid unduly burdening or blaming employers; it
would also avoid creating economic incentives for discrimination against Black Eng-
lish speakers.
287. Cf Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1379-82 (arguing that the reasonable accom-
modation framework should be applied in the context of accent discrimination).
Professor Matsuda borrows this framework from disability law, in particular the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), and
47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. III 1991). See Matusda, supra note 2, at 1381. Professors
Karlan and Rutherglen have also suggested that reasonable accommodation law
might be applied appropriately to assist black employees with limited reading and
writing skills. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimina-
tion, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1996). They assume that
such deficits are "a direct result of having attended inferior, poorly funded public
schools beset by the lingering effects of de jure segregation .... I Id. at 4. I agree with
this assessment, but I would add that such deficits are also a direct result of speaking
a stigmatized-indeed, unrecognized---dialect which is less closely related to Standard
Written English than the Standard English dialect.
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fully in the workforce or society at large.2 Black English
speakers with weak written language skills experience a type
of disability that is especially contingent: if history had been
otherwise, our standard written language could have been
based on Black English, and Standard English speakers would
be those who required accommodation. Thus, both the general
principle of avoiding arbitrary exclusion and the particular re-
sponsibility we collectively bear for creating this disability
point towards the application of a reasonable accommodation
requirement for Black English speakers with weak written
language skills.
The likelihood of any court adopting this solution is admit-
tedly rather low, since it requires both a sophisticated
understanding of language facts and an extension of Title VII
doctrine. The use of Title VII to prevent discrimination against
spoken Black English is comparatively less radical: once the
linguistic facts concerning Black English are made clear, it is
hard to deny that Title VII should protect speakers of Black
English from discrimination by employers.
rV. THE BROADER CONTEXT
What, then, is "radical" about the radical solution? It cannot
be the legal argument: a fairly straightforward application of
disparate impact doctrine to the linguistic facts regarding
Black English should permit Title VII-as it is currently writ-
ten and interpreted-to protect speakers of Black English
from employment discrimination. What people find radical
about the solution offered above is not the legal argument, but
rather the linguistic facts upon which the legal argument is
based. This is ironic, given how uncontroversial these linguis-
tic facts are within the linguistic community. As Professor
Rosina Lippi-Green notes, it is "[t]he least disputed issues
around language structure and function, the ones linguists ar-
gue about least, ... which are most often challenged by non-
linguists, and with the greatest vehemence and emotion."289
The recent public debate over the "Ebonics" resolution in
Oakland29 demonstrated just how emotional language issues
288. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 287, at 38-39.
289. LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 9.
290. See supra notes 5, 11, 16-24, and accompanying text (discussing the Oakland
debate).
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can be: The Oakland School Board's proposal to officially rec-
ognize Black English as a valid dialect did not just "strike most
people as misguided; it made many people very angry.2 9'
But why is it so difficult for people to accept the linguistic
facts about Black English? In part, our resistance-and I do
mean to include myself here-results from habit; we are used
to thinking about Standard English and nonstandard dialects
in a certain way-the way that proponents of Standard Lan-
guage Ideology in the schools, media, and entertainment
industry would like us to think-and it takes a certain amount
of mental energy to overcome this habit. In other words, the
linguistic facts are hard to accept because they differ so mark-
edly from what we have been told our entire lives. It is as if a
group of scientists suddenly attempted to convince us that the
sun does indeed revolve around the earth-we would need to
review the evidence carefully before we could be convinced.
But habit can only provide a partial answer, because it does
not explain why the facts regarding Black English give rise to
so much anger. It may be that we would be just as resistant to
new facts regarding the sun's orbit, but exposure to such facts
would be unlikely to lead to the kind of fury evidenced in the
Oakland "Ebonics" debate. The anger can only be explained if
we examine our investment in Standard Language Ideology-
if we ask what we have to lose by accepting the facts about
Black English.2' For speakers of Standard English-both
black and white-the belief that Standard English somehow
merits being the standard also means that they themselves
have merit. Speaking Standard English becomes a virtue; be-
ing a speaker of Standard English means that one has earned
whatever material and social advantages one may have. To
speakers of Black English, Standard Language Ideology holds
out a promise: that they too could have these material and so-
cial advantages if they would "only" learn to speak "proper"
English. The common sense view of Black English as bad
grammar offers all of us a convenient explanation--even what
one could call a comforting explanation-for inequalities that
would otherwise be too painful and too challenging. This is a
classic example of hegemony: "[Tihe means by which a system
291. The debate over the Oakland "Ebonics" proposal was only the most recent
and well-publicized debate over the status of Black English. For other examples of
angry reactions to the claim that Black English is a valid dialect, see LIPPI-GREEN,
supra note 2, at 193-97 (describing reactions of call-in viewers and audience members
during a Black English discussion on a 1987 Oprah Winfrey show).
292. See generally LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2 (discussing language ideology).
[VOL. 31:3
Against Common Sense
of attitudes and beliefs, permeating both popular conscious-
ness and the ideology of elites, reinforces existing social
arrangements and convinces the dominated classes that the
existing order is inevitable."2 93
A personal and rather painful memory demonstrates just
how pervasive our resistance to linguistic facts can be: After
six years spent studying cognitive science and linguistics (and
writing obscure papers on topics such as "Agreement Morphol-
ogy in Squamish"), I took a job teaching science in a public
middle school in New York City. Most of my students were
black, and not surprisingly, they spoke Black English. As a
white woman who grew up near Seattle, I speak a West Coast
variety of Standard English. This dialect difference presented
no comprehension problems; my students understood my
speech and I understood theirs. Like all teenagers-not just
those who speak Black English-they did have a tendency to
use slang words. This was also not a problem. In fact, it pro-
vided an easy opportunity for my students to teach me
something: I quickly learned what it meant when they noted
that my shoes were "played-out"; I was happy if they thought
an experiment that we had done was "fly"; and I must admit to
feeling some pride when they exclaimed, in reaction to my
quick verbal response to a student who was being difficult,
"Ms. Gaulding learnin' t' diss!" I like to think back on these
moments. The moment I do not like, to think back on is the
time when I made fun of a student for using the Black English
negative concord construction ("If 'you didn't have no time to
do your homework,' doesn't that mean you did have some
time?").2" I said this despite the fact that I was intimately fa-
miliar with the "linguistic facts of life"295-- despite the fact that
I knew better. What was I thinking? I suppose the best answer
is that I wasn't thinking at all. Rather, I was acting
(thoughtlessly but effectively) as a conduit for the common
sense views about Black English, which so dramatically, and
tragically limit that student's opportunities in life.
293. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1351 (citing ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM
THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans. 1971)); see also LIPPI-GREEN,
supra note 2, at 66-67 (explaining the relationship between Standard Language Ide-
ology and Gramsci's concept of hegemony).
294. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (explaining the negative con-
cord construction in Black English).
295. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 7-40 (summarizing the "linguistic facts of
life").
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In the face of these difficulties, what should we do? By pos-
ing this question, this Article places itself within the most
optimistic strand of the Critical Race Theory tradition.2" It is a
modernist narrative (what Mari Matsuda might call "quaintly
modernist"),29 and as such, actually far more conventional
than radical.298 It demonstrates "a commitment to a vision of
liberation from racism through right reason" and a "confiden[cel
that crafting the correct theory of race and racism can help lead
to enlightenment, empowerment, and finally to emancipation:
that, indeed, the truth shall set [us] free."299
As a specific answer to the question "what should we do?,"
this Article proposes that we invoke Title VII to protect speak-
ers of Black English from employment discrimination. But the
proposed litigation strategy should actually represent only one
aspect of a broader effort to restructure the relationship be-
tween Standard English and Black English. Currently the two
dialects and their respective speakers occupy unequal posi-
tions in our culture. According to common sense, Standard
English is the norm, while Black English is a marked
"other";30° Standard English is simply English, while Black
English is a dialect (if that); Standard English is unaccented
and ethnically neutral, while Black English is accented and
ethnically marked.30' In rejecting the common sense view of
Black English, we must also reject the common sense view of
Standard English: we need to give Standard English a new
identity as a dialect, to be able to hear the Standard English
296. This Article has been deeply influenced by Professor Mari Matsuda's 1991 ar-
ticle on accent discrimination which was also a foundational article for the Critical
Race Theory tradition. See Matsuda, supra note 2; see also CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberld Williams Crenshaw et al.
eds., 1995). For an especially lucid discussion of the relationship between Critical Race
Theory's optimistic, modernist side and its more skeptical, postmodernist side, see
Harris, supra note 182. The arguments made in this Article also fit well within the
"cultural domination" approach to equality questions described by Martha Chamallas.
See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title
VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994).
297. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1330.
298. See Harris, supra note 182, at 752 ("[Olne characteristic of conventional legal
scholarship is its insistent 'normativity': the little voice that constantly asks legal
scholars, 'So, what should we do?'").
299. Id. at 743.
300. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1372 (discussing the role of blacks as "the
other"); Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1361 (discussing the role of Standard English as the
norm).
301. The speech pathologists who specialize in "accent reduction" would never di-
rect their services to Standard English speakers, since under the common sense view,
Standard English speakers have no accent. See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 2, at 144-46;
Atkins, supra note 15.
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accent and see Standard English ethnicity.30 2 Of course, these
two efforts are intertwined: as Title VII protection allows more
Black English speakers to obtain jobs with greater promi-
nence, it will become easier to see that both dialects can
contribute to a valuable diversity in the workplace.
At both levels the focus should be on responsibility rather
than blame. 3 The litigation strategy proposed by this Article
reflects this focus by arguing that discrimination against
Black English falls under the disparate impact framework
rather than the disparate treatment framework. Under the
disparate impact framework, employers must take responsi-
bility for their inappropriate reactions to Black English, but
they need not be blamed or punished. 3° The distinction applies
to individuals as well: none of us is to blame for the current
problems facing Black English speakers, but we all have a re-
sponsibility to help solve these problems.3 5
Some observers fear that respecting Black English can only
lead to further segregation and subordination of blacks. One
columnist, for example, argues that proponents of Black English
are making "an attempt to sabotage the efforts of the black
community to succeed in society by encouraging a language that
302. Recognizing the ethnicity associated with Standard English could be one way
to increase whites' race consciousness and to decrease the "Transparency Phenome-
non." See Flagg, supra note 1, at 957 (discussing the "Transparency Phenomenon" in
the context of Equal Protection law); see also Flagg, supra note 102 (applying a similar
analysis in proposing a Title VII remedy for white decisionmaking). Readers might
wonder how Standard English could be "ethnic," given that some nonwhites also
speak this dialect. I would argue that diversity among Standard English speakers
does not diminish its ethnic quality; it merely reflects the radical plurality possible in
a nation "in which an Okinawan vendor serves Kosher pastrami and stir-fried vegeta-
bles wrapped in a tortilla to young white punk rockers at 3:00 a.m. in the morning."
Matsuda, supra note 2, at 1403.
303. For further discussion of the advantages of responsibility over blame, see
Flagg, supra note 1, at 985-91 (arguing that the concept of blame is not useful in the
context of Equal Protection law); Krieger, supra note 204, at 1243-44 (explaining why
punitive damages should not be awarded for cognitive-bias-based disparate treat-
ment).
304. The remedies available to disparate impact plaintiffs are more limited than
those available to disparate treatment plaintiffs, since under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, only victims of "intentional discrimination" (defined as "not disparate impact
discrimination") may be awarded compensatory or punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
305. Linguists may have a special responsibility to help educate the public about
language facts. See Rickford, Unequal Partnership, supra note 285. Professor Rickford
argues that linguists, while profiting greatly from studies of Black English, have done
little to help solve the problems facing Black English speakers; he proposes that lin-
guists need to adopt a general principle of "service in return." Id.
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impedes assimilation."3" Responding to the decision of the
Oakland, California School Board to recognize Black English
as a valid language,3°7 another commentator argued: "The
Oakland plan is nothing more than inverted racism."30 This
fear should be lessened to the extent that the linguistic argu-
ments in support of Black English are made clear. The fear
could quickly turn to hope if Title VII's promise of equality be-
gins to be realized.
In proposing that we invoke Title VII law to prevent dis-
crimination against Black English speakers, this Article
rejects the claim that we need to "be realistic," i.e., to just focus
on teaching blacks Standard English so that they can succeed. 9
Being "realistic" has superficial appeal because it seems easier
than implementing a radical legal solution that goes against
common sense. After all, "[plopular notions about language are
so thoroughly entrenched that they're not going to be overcome
overnight. We're still confronting the same thinking we encoun-
tered 20 years ago. I guess that doesn't say much for the rate of
social change."10
Even Steven Pinker argues that, although terms like "bad
grammar," "fractured syntax," and "incorrect usage" are scien-
tifically inaccurate ways to describe Black English, "[i]t is just
common sense that people should be given every encourage-
ment and opportunity to learn the dialect that has become the
standard one in their society and to employ it in many formal
settings."
The question is, what does it mean to give people "every en-
couragement and opportunity?" First, it is unlikely that
applying Title VII law to protect Black English speakers would
306. Abraham, supra note 19; see also Aponte, supra note 20, at 11 (making the
same argument).
307. See supra notes 5, 11, and 88 (discussing controversy surrounding Oakland
decision).
308. Shaw, supra note 5.
309. See, e.g., "Ebonics" Be Gone, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 20, 1996, at A22 (rejecting
the Oakland decision because [in the real world of colleges and commerce and com-
munication, it's not OK to speak Ebonics as a primary language").
310. ORR, supra note 17, at 12 (quoting Walt Wolfram, a linguist who studies
Black English).
311. PINKER, supra note 2, at 400; see also Sol Adler, Bidialectism? Mandatory or
Elective?, ASHA (AMERICAN SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASSOCIATION), Jan. 1987, at
41; Social Dialects Position Paper, ASHA (AMERICAN SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING
ASSOCIATION), Sept. 1983 reprinted in ASHA, Jan. 1987, at 45; Betsy L. Winsboro &
Irvin D. Solomon, Standard English vs. 'The American Dream," EDUC. DIG., Dec. 1990,
at 51-52; Lee, supra note 14 at Al, D22; Page, supra note 20; Thomas, supra note 20;
Cynthia Walker, Lessons Target Language as Barrier for Blacks Education, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 11.
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mean that these speakers would no longer be adequately
"encouraged" to learn Standard English. On a practical level,
not everyone has the resources or stamina to pursue a Title
VII suit. Even if Title VII law could completely eliminate dis-
crimination by employers, the ability to speak Standard
English would remain an advantage in other contexts-for ex-
ample, in social, political, and academic realms.
More importantly, "just being realistic" (and encouraging
Black English speakers to learn Standard English by allowing
employers to discriminate against them) is simply not right:
why should blacks bear the burden of Americans' uninformed
beliefs about language? Imagine that blacks could become
white in appearance with the same amount of effort it would
take for them to learn Standard English."' This would provide
a "realistic" solution to problems of discrimination-ignoring
the irrationality of the prejudice and simply eliminating the
effects as quickly as possible. But few would demand that we
adopt this solution. Why should it be our approach when it
comes to language?
The second part of the question posed above deserves more
attention: what would it mean to give Black English speakers
"every opportunity" to learn Standard English? At the very
least, it would require teachers: (1) to understand the nature
of Black English as a valid form of human language and (2) to
respect the linguistic skills that Black English speaking chil-
dren bring to school. Numerous studies have shown that this
scientifically based approach produces far better results than
the common sense approach of repeatedly correcting children's
"error-filled" speech.31 Taking such an approach is not merely
"politically correct." Given the 'linguistic facts, the approach
represents true common sense: learning a second dialect is
naturally easier if it is seen as a process of building on a first
dialect, whose properties children are encouraged to examine,
rather than an endless, demoralizing process of "correcting
mistakes."
Given that effective means do exist to help children acquire
Standard English, the radical solution proposed by this Article
could be seen as a stopgap solution: perhaps Black English
speakers should only receive Title VII protection to the extent
312. Cf Jerome M. Culp, The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Culture, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2613 (1994) (imagining various reactions to a pill that could turn people
white).
313. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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that there still exist adult speakers who did not receive an
adequate opportunity to learn Standard English as children.
Once a certain quorum of effective school programs was in
place, plaintiffs could be required to prove that they in par-
ticular were denied the necessary opportunity to learn
Standard English as a second dialect.
Before adopting such a "minimally radical" solution, how-
ever, we ought to consider carefully what the ultimate goal of
discrimination law is. If the goal is merely to ensure that
members of historically subordinated groups face no par-
ticular disadvantage in the workplace, then the minimally
radical solution would be exactly the right one to institute. If,
on the other hand, discrimination law reflects a positive re-
gard for diversity, then the minimally radical solution would
be completely misguided, since it would lead to an unneces-
sary, artificial, and arbitrary uniformity in public speech.
On the other hand, the radical solution might be seen as
not radical enough-one could argue that it is hypocritical to
extend Title VII protection to Black English, but not to other
nonstandard dialects, such as the one spoken by white
Southerners. After all, the prejudice against these dialects is
just as irrational as the prejudice against Black English.
But closer analysis shows that the accusation of hypocrisy
is misplaced. For one, Southerners are simply not as
disadvantaged by discrimination against their dialect,
because they do at least have the option of pursuing jobs in
regions where that dialect is the norm rather than the
exception. Because blacks experience far greater economic
subordination and isolation than Southerners, the option of
remaining within such a "speech ghetto" is much more
limiting for them. Furthermore, American discrimination law
is simply not all-encompassing. It does not forbid all forms of
prejudice and injustice, but rather only those forms related to
specific factors such as race, gender, and disability. Poverty
and powerlessness are factors closely linked to the use of a
nonstandard dialect (since the rich and powerful can define
which dialect is "standard"). But poverty is not considered a
suspect classification 4 and Title VII does not forbid employers
from discriminating, directly or indirectly, against the poor
and powerless. This may be unfair, but it is the law. It is one
thing to fail to alter this law to create new rights for the poor




and powerless in society and quite another to fail to enforce
existing law, where science and legal analysis strongly
suggest it should apply.
CONCLUSION
Black English is a problem, and quite a serious one, but
not for the reason that most people think. Although common
sense suggests that Black English is just bad grammar, the
linguistic evidence shows otherwise. To ignore this linguistic
evidence, to find it "interesting as science," while refusing to
give it "social, political, or ... ethical" meaning (as one com-
mentator has recommended),315 would be a grave error that
would significantly impede our ability to eliminate the long
term effects of racism:
IT]here can be no question that the institution of slavery
will continue to leave tremendous gaps between blacks
and whites as long as the majority of blacks cannot com-
pete with their white counterparts in the American job
market. The linguistic dimension forms just a small
segment of this picture, but it is one dimension where
social [and cognitive] science can provide accurate in-
sights. 31
6
Linguistics provides the insight that Black English is a
language every bit as valid, grammatical, and expressive as
Standard English, a language that can be just as intelligible
to Standard English speakers as British English, and just as
fascinating and appealing in its subtle differences. It shows
us that the real problem lies not with the prevalence of Black
English but with employers'-and others'-reaction to it. By
incorporating this insight and protecting Black English
speakers from employment discrimination, Title VII could
help fulfill some of the highest aspirations of our civil rights
law. Indeed, the invocation of Title VII could be critical, be-
cause our attempts to create a more inclusive society can
315. Jay Tolson, Minding the Language Shop, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb.25, 1994 at 5D
(reviewing Steven Pinker's book The Language Instinct, supra note 2).
316. BAUGH, supra note 70, at 58. As with much other research on Black English,
Baugh's work draws on both social science (sociolinguistics) and cognitive science
(cognitive linguistics). See supra note 79.
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only succeed if the law enables us to recognize and combat
the most pernicious type of discrimination-the type that
calls itself "common sense."
